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ABSTRACT
THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON THE MINDANAO
RESISTANCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Michael Anthony Balis
Old Dominion University, 1990
Director: Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr.
This thesis examines the American participation in the
development of resistance against the Japanese on Mindanao
Island in the Philippines, 1942-1945.

Americans directed

the overall resistance movement and commanded most of
the provinces.

As leaders Americans played a key role in

the evolution of the resistance from an independent
guerrilla force to a partisan force that gave U.S. forces
combat and intelligence assistance.

The most important

information for the thesis came from the MacArthur Archives,
the Hayden Papers at the University of Michigan, the U.S.
Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, and
correspondence with 14 men who served with the Mindanao
resistance.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the American participation in the
development of resistance against the Japanese on Mindanao
Island, 1942-1945.

In December 1941, Japanese forces

launched their attacks against United States forces at Pearl
Harbor and in the Philippines and British forces in South
East Asia.

The Japanese also invaded the U.S.-controlled

Philippine Islands on 8 December 1941 and swept through them
in a six-month campaign.

Filipino and American forces under

General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army, were stationed on
Mindanao until their surrender to Japanese forces in May
1942.

The thesis examines the activities of Americans

remaining on Mindanao after May 1942 who did not accept
defeat and who resisted the Japanese.
This thesis contains several subtopics.

It treats the

island1s fall to the Japanese in 1942 and how subsequent
Japanese abuse of the population led to indigenous
resistance.

It analyzes how three indigenous and four

American leaders organized the independent guerrilla groups.
It explores how Colonel Wendell Fertig, U.S. Army Reserve,
unified the separate guerrilla groups.

It explains

conflicts between Fertig and three Mindanaoan leaders over
the establishment of Fertig!s authority and the resolutions
of those conflicts in an effort to see how unified command
1
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developed.

It treats Japanese military operations against

the American-led resistance in order to clarify the dangers
the resistance faced.

It analyzes the development of the

resistance by its passive and active reactions to Japanese
military pressure.

It examines the role of MacArthur's

headquarters, which supplied and directed Fertig beginning
in January 1943 in converting an independent guerrilla force
into a partisan force that followed U.S. Army orders.

It

also analyzes the contributions of Fertig and his province
commanders in this evolution.

It finally asks how

operations in support of American forces that landed or the
island in 1945 made the Mindanao resistance a true partisan
force.
There are significant differences between guerrilla
and partisan warfare.
control.

The most important difference is

A guerrilla force is independent of outside

military command.

It may choose to assist a military force

at times that its leaders are free to decide.

Because the

guerrilla force is not allied with a military force, its war
is usually more protracted.1 A partisan unit is a
resistance force that is directly under military orders.
Its missions include direct combat support, intelligence
gathering, rescuing prisoners, cutting communications and
harassing enemy movements.

Because of the average

partisan's lack of training in communications and
1Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York:
Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1961), 72.
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intelligence, his activities usually require the supported
military force to instruct the partisan in those tasks.

The

arms and ammunition supplied by an allied military
organization gives the partisans firepower superior to that
of a guerrilla force.2
Guerrilla and partisan warfare share some
similarities.

Brutal foreign invaders or harsh indigenous

leaders can anger people so much that they fight their
enemies through partisan or guerrilla war.

Successful

guerrillas and partisans respect civilian property; so, they
earn the indigenous population's support.
support to survive and grow.

Both require such

Successful groups receive

supplies, shelter, recruits, and intelligence from friendly
inhabitants.

Most guerrillas and partisans use their

superior knowledge of the terrain to ambush the usually
better-armed enemy troops and then disperse to avoid costly
battles.3
Because the guerrilla missions change to include
intelligence gathering and combat support of military
operations, the transition to partisan warfare requires
articulate and flexible leadership.

Fertig and his four

20tto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York; Praeger
Publishers, 1962), 75-77; Carl von Clausewitz, On War,
trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-83.
3Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1979), 78-93; Gerard Chaliand, Guerrilla
Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to
Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982), 1-32.
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American commanders were sufficiently persuasive to convince
local peasants and townspeople that organized guerrilla
warfare would protect their families from Japanese
brutality.

The guerrilla leaders earned widespread respect

from the indigenous people who in turn supported the
guerrillas with clothing, shelter, recruits, and
information.

MacArthur appointed Fertig to command the

Mindanao resistance and transform it into a partisan force.
Since Fertig earned the respect of the major guerrilla
leaders, he convinced them to come under his command.

After

Fertig established his authority over the separate guerrilla
units, the guerrillas fell under military authority and they
became partisans who first collected and sent intelligence
to MacArthur and later supported his landings on Mindanao.
The most important documents for this thesis came from
the MacArthur Archives in Norfolk, Virginia.

Documents in

Record Group 16 include MacArthur's orders to Fertig,
Fertig's reports on the strength and growth of the
resistance, as well as on Japanese activities.

Record Group

3 contains Japanese reports on the Mindanao resistance
including partisan radio station locations, directives on
counter-partisan operations, and data on combat results.
The General Robert Eichelberger Papers at Duke
University has post-war interviews with Japanese generals
who served on Mindanao that describe Japanese
counter-partisan operations, Japanese defense plans, as well
as partisan activities in 1944 and 1945.
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The Joseph Hayden Papers at the University of Michigan
contain a valuable report made by an American schoolteacher,
Edward Kuder, who fought the Japanese alongside the Moslem
Moro resistance.

Kuder describes their contributions to the

resistance and was a witness to much that he describes.

He

provides key answers on how the Moslems resisted.
John Keats's book, They Fought Alone, is a good
secondary source on Fertig's view of the resistance.

It is

not documented, but other works in the MacArthur Archives
support most of his facts.

Keats had access to Fertig's

diary which was unavailable to the author.

Keats portrays

Fertig and Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army Reserve, as the
only important leaders.4
American guerrillas wrote four useful books.

Because

Return to Freedom by Colonel Sam Grashio, U.S. Air Force,
and Bernard Norling contains cross-references to other books
on the Mindanao resistance, it is the best book in this
category.

Grashio describes partisan activities in the

Agusan Province.

Rice and Salt by Brigadier General John

McGee, U.S. Army, summarizes the origins and growth of
resistance in the Zamboanga Province based cn his service
with the partisans. Never Sav Die by Colonel Jack Hawkins,
U.S. Marine Corps, discusses his four-month service in the
Agusan Province resistance.

Philippine Diarv by Colonel

Steve Mellnick, U.S. Army, is more emotional than the
4John Keats, They Fought Alone (New York and
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963).
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others.

However, documentary evidence supports much of his

account.5
Thirteen Americans and one Australian who fought with
the resistance were generous enough to provide this author
with information.

They were Colonel Robert Bowler, U.S.

Army; Lieutenant Sam Grashio, U.S. Army Air Forces; Captain
Erling Jonassen, U.S. Army; Major Rex Blow, Royal Australian
Army; Captain Paul Marshall, U.S. Army; Sergeant Ken Newton,
U.S. Army Air Forces; Lieutenant Robert Merchant, U.S. Army;
Captain Robert Spielman, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Gerald
Chapman, U.S. Army Air Forces; Lieutenant Iliff Richardson,
U.S. Navy; Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Childress, U.S. Army;
Chief Petty Officer Ellwood Offret, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant
Colonel Austin Schofner, U.S. Marine Corps; and Dr. William
Johnson, DDS.

All of these men gave clear and candid

answers to this author's questions.

Because they gave

information on battles, partisan tactics and the role that
Americans played in the resistance which is not found
elsewhere, their perspectives have contributed much to this
thesis.
This thesis attempts a comprehensive examination of
the American-led resistance groups on Mindanao Island.

It

5Jack Hawkins, Never Sav Die (Philadelphia: Dorrance
and Co., 1966); Samuel Grashio and Bernard Norling, Return
to Freedom (Tulsa: MCN Press, 1982); Steve Mellnick,
Philippine Diarv 1941-1945 (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold
Co., 1969) ; John McGee, Rice and Salt: A History of the
Defense and Occupation of Mindanao During World War Two (San
Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1963).
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is based on archival and secondary sources as well as
personal correspondence.

Japanese reports on the partisans

American partisan accounts, and official U.S. Army messages
made it possible to analyze the resistance from varied
perspectives.
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CHAPTER 1
ORIGINS OF RESISTANCE

In December 1941, Japan's and America's national
interests collided.

The U.S. believed that Japanese

expansion in China and Indo-China would eventually threaten
American interests in the Pacific; so, the Americans refused
to sell oil to Japan.

The Japanese believed that they could

not maintain their empire without American oil imports.
Japan saw this as a conspiracy by a loose coalition of the
United States, Britain, and the government of the
Netherlands in exile to weaken her militarily and
economically.

The Japanese government under General Hideki

Tojo believed the United States would then attack Japan.
After Japan's border clashes with the Soviets in 1939, Tojo
expected the Soviets to invade Japanese held territory in
China and Manchuria.

The Japanese thought that a desperate

gamble such as striking the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and
seizing the oil rich Dutch East Indies was preferable to
letting their empire crumble to the inevitable U.S.,
British, Dutch, and Soviet pressure.

The United States

believed that if she strengthened her relations with
Britain, the Netherlands, and China, she would deter the
Japanese from attacking the Philippines and other U.S.
possesions.

The American government became even more
8
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determined to check Japanese aggression when Japan allied
herself with Germany and Italy.

The Japanese attacked the

U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and
destroyed two battleships, damaged six others, crippled
three destroyers, and damaged three light cruisers.

This

stunned the U.S. Pacific Fleet and left the Philippines,
Malaya, and Dutch East Indies open to conquest.1
The Japanese campaign to capture the Philippines
lasted from December 1941 to May 1942.

Japan landed her

main invasion force in the Philippines on 10 December 1941.
Those islands contained important natural resources needed
by her war industry, and the archipelago was an important
part of the island shield Japan was building across the
Pacific against U.S. forces.

Japanese planes would have

many airfields to launch attacks on U.S. invasion fleets.
Japanese ground forces would gain mountainous and jungle
covered islands that were easy to fortify.

The Japanese

14th Army under General Masaharu Homma forced MacArthur's
forces in Luzon to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and
Corregidor Island early in 1942.

The rest of Homma's army

swept across the Visayas in April and May 1942.

Because of

their low supplies and the hopelessness of rescue by the
1Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial
Japanese Navy 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1978), 1-103; Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The
American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 6265; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia
and the Pacific. Origins of Modern Wars Series, ed. Harold
Hearder (New York: Longman, 1987), 168-86.
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U.S. Pacific Fleet, further resistance by the Americans and
Filipinos became meaningless.

MacArthur left Lieutenant

General Jonathan Wainwright, U.S. Army, in command of the
Philippines and went to Australia to prepare a
counteroffensive against the Japanese.2
Most of the Filipino and American troops on Mindanao
were not trained or equipped to go into combat with the
Japanese force.

The 101st and 102nd Philippine Army

Divisions were stationed on Mindanao.

Major General William

Sharp, U.S. Army, commanded the island's garrison beginning
in January 1942.

Both divisions were understrength in

trained infantrymen; so, policemen and artillerymen
bolstered them.

There was too little ammunition for

training troops on a firing line; so, the U.S. and Filipino
soldiers never learned to fire live ammunition.3

Most of

their weapons were from the First World War; so, they had
many damaged and obsolete parts.

Because ammunition for

their World War I mortars had not been made since 1918, a
commander ordered his unit to push the mortars over a cliff.
Some American officers were relatively new to the island,
2John Toland, The Rising Sun; The Decline and Fall of
the Japanese Empire. 1936-1945 (New York; Bantam Books,
1986), 109-10, 172, 180, 194; Paul Kennedy, Pacific
Onslaught 7 December 1941-7 February 1943 (New York;
Ballantine Books, 1972), 15-23, 55-69.
3Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. 2d ed.,
U.S. Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.; Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
1978), 508.
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and they had a hard time communicating with the Filipinos.4
Sharp organized the island into five regions.

Since

each region had few useful roads, defense of the interior
was relatively simple.

Sharp ordered each defense region to

hold the Japanese as long as possible in the hope
reinforcements would arrive before the Del Monte airfields
near Cagayan were lost.5

Sharp lacked a friendly navy; so,

he could not intercept and destroy the Japanese invasion
force at sea.

Sharp only planned to defend likely landing

areas near Cagayan and Cotabato cities.
The Japanese completed their Mindanao invasion plan
while the U.S. garrison struggled to prepare its defenses.
As Mindanao's airfields and ports were useful staging areas
for Japanese troops destined for the invasion of the Dutch
East Indies, the Japanese planned to capture the island.
The Japanese plan was to land at Macajalar Bay, the Moro
Gulf, and Davao Gulf.

Each landing force contained no more

than 5,000 of men in an effort to push the U.S. forces
inland along the Sayre Road and Highway One and encircle
them.

The Japanese planned to use their superior air and

4Ken Newton, Sergeant, U.S. Army Air Forces, (ret.),
letter to author, 24 July 1989; Charles Willoughby,
"Critique of Morton's Fall of the Philippines," Record Group
[hereafter RG] 23, Box 12, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk,
Virginia [hereafter MA].
5Sharp to All Sector Commanders and Force Reserves, 24
February 1942, "U.S. Army Forces Far East Headquarters,
Mindanao Force Directive," 5 March 1942, RG 30, Box 24, MA.
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armor to crush the final U.S. defense positions.6
Needing the Davao City port on Mindanao to stage their
invasion of the Dutch East Indies scheduled for January
1942, the Japanese sent a battalion of 1,000 men under
Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Miura to capture the port on
20 December 1941.

Miura pushed Colonel Roger Hilsman's

900-man force from the Davao-Digos area and secured it.7
The Kawaguchi Detachment of 4,852 men landed at Parang
and Cotabato cities on 29 April 1942.

Three infantry

battalions, one artillery battalion deployed as infantry,
and police troops defended this area.

Three hundred

Japanese attempted to outflank the defenders by going down
the Mindanao River in barges on 31 April.

This situation

forced the sector commander, Colonel Russell Nelson, U.S.
Army, to leave Highway One and move northeast to defend the
trails that led to the Sayre Road.

Other Kawaguchi units

landed near Parang and faced a Filipino Rifle Regiment. The
Japanese outflanked the Filipinos and forced them to retreat
to Lanao Province.8
The island's defenders simultaneously contended with
the Japanese Miura detachment which was reinforced to a
strength of 4,000 men in April 1942.

Colonel William

Norton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-9.
7Hilsman to Vachon, 26 January 1942, RG 30, Box 24,
MA; Morton, Fall of the Philippines. 507-19. The author
does not know the level of training of the Miura Detachment
or Hillsman's force.
Norton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-9.
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Graves, U.S. Army, took command of the Digos area from
Hilsman.

Until Graves's 2,000 men withdrew to secure the

vital Kabacan Road junction against the Kawaguchi
Detachment, the Americans and Filipinos conducted a skillful
defense.

The Americans and Filipinos successfully defended

Kabacan and protected the 6,000 men at Cagayan and Del Monte
from a Japanese attack in their rear until their
surrender.9
The roughly 4,000-man Kawamura Detachment assaulted
Macajalar Bay on 3 May 1942.

Two artillery regiments and an

infantry regiment defended the beach.

Sharp committed his

regimental reserve to halt Japanese flanking attacks along
the Sayre Road.

Enemy troops infiltrated the U.S.

positions, which were defended by about 6,000 men, and the
Japanese caused so much confusion among the U.S. and
Filipino troops that the Kawamura Detachment knocked them
out of two defense lines on the highway.10
Because the Japanese were on the verge of defeating
U.S. forces in the Philippines, Sharp followed General
Wainwright's May 1942 order to surrender.

The Japanese

broke the defense line near the important Del Monte
airfields, while the entire U.S. Cotabato sector fell in
April.11 Japanese troops had landed on Corregidor island
9Colonel Roger B. Hilsman, "The Occupation and
Withdrawal from Davao," 26 January 1942, RG 30, Box 24, MA.
10Morton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-19.
11McGee, Rice and Salt, xviii.
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where Wainwright was with the last organized resistance,
wainwright telegraphed Sharp that unless all U.S. forces
surrendered, the Japanese would continue killing his men.
Sharp then ordered his men to surrender.12
After the collapse of the U.S. and Filipino forces,
Mindanao became a part of a Japanese Empire that was
oppressive to conquered people throughout most of the Far
East.

It is unclear whether Japanese senior officers and

national leaders or local commanders ordered the atrocities.
A small group of Japanese scientists performed medical
experiments on Manchurians while the Japanese troops
followed a "Kill All, Burn All, Loot All" policy in Chinese
cities and villages.

For example, Japanese troops murdered

more than 200,000 people in Nanking, China.

The Japanese

killed more than 60,000 Koreans in Japanese mines and
factories.

Japanese-run labor gangs killed more than

100,000 Indonesians.

Renegade Japanese patrols transferred

the corporal punishment they received from their leaders to
civilians and prisoners.

Even pro-Japanese leaders like Ba

Maw of Burma and Sukharno of Indonesia later turned against
their harsh Japanese rulers.
The Japanese tried to instill fear into the Mindanao
12Wainwright to Sharp, 7 May 1942, RG 16, Box 7, MA;
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur. vol. 2, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975), 148.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
populace.13 They assigned no more than 10,000 men to rule
over 1,000,000 Mindanaoans.

The garrison's mission was to

protect the ports at Davao, Zamboanga, and Cagayan from
guerrillas.

Japanese troops were concentrated around the

cities of Zamboanga, Davao, Cagayan, and Surigao with
smaller outposts deeper inside Mindanao tc gather food.

In

Mindanao, Japanese leaders believed that if they spread
enough fear by public executions of suspected guerrillas and
by controlling their movements that the islanders would be
too afraid to rebel or to slow Japanese exploitation of
Mindanao's wood, rice, and gold resources.

Because many

Japanese combat troops left Mindanao to fight Dutch ground
forces in the East Indies, the Japanese garrison remaining
on Mindanao was small.

Although the Japanese believed that

they had to instill fear in the indigenous population to
rule them, they only assigned an insufficient 7,000 to
10,000-man garrison for this task.14
The Japanese showed how little they understood the
militant pride of the Moros, all of whom were Moslem.
Catholic Spaniards and Filipinos had tried to convert the
Moros to Christianity for 200 years; so, the Moros regarded
13John Dower, War Without Mercy; Race and Power in the
Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 41-48; Saburo
Ienaga, The Pacific War 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on
Japan's Role in World War II (New York.: Pantheon Books,
1978), 153-80.
14WYZB to MacArthur, 15 July 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA;
K«ats, They Fought Alone. 41-77, 91-103, 221; Cameron
Forbes, The Philippine Islands, vol. 2, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1928), 49.
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any outsiders as a threat.

Because there were incessant

conflicts between Moro tribes and Christian Filipinos, each
tribe, comprised of interrelated families, lived in forts
under their spiritual and military leaders called Datus.
Any outsider who antagonized any of these tribes or families
faced the danger of large tribal alliances forming and
attacking them.

However, Japanese patrols crossed Moro

areas without permission.

Moro territory was under a Datu's

control, and he had hundreds of followers who were ready to
fight to the death for him.15 Because the Datu’s followers
might believe he could not control his own land, unannounced
Japanese intrusions were a clear insult to him.16
The Japanese physically abused the Moros instead of
trying to manipulate the latter's traditional hatred of
Filipinos to their advantage.

The Japanese believed that

the Moros would be too intimidated to resist; so, the
Japanese underestimated Moro guerrilla war traditions and
family pride.

The Japanese applied indiscriminate terror in

an attempt to forestall a guerrilla movement.

For example,

Japanese slapped Moros for not bowing to them.

They also

suffocated them with water torture and stabbed them.

If

15Ralph Thomas, Asia for Asiatics (Illigan City,
Mindanao Island; Dunsalan Research Center, 1977), 1-5;
Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law ir. a Philippine
Moslem Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1972), 52-59, 121-33; Edward Kuder, "The Philippines Never
Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 10 February 1945, 11.
16Kuder, "The Philippines Never Surrendered, "Saturday
Evening Post. 24 February 1945, 23, 90.
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Japanese troops were sniped at, Japanese patrols razed
entire villages.

Japanese officers refused to meet with

Moro leaders to discuss problems.17
The Japanese suppressed all political parties except
for the collaborationist Kalipibi Party made up of Moros and
Filipinos.

This party consisted of those who tried to

protect their villages by interceding in disputes between
the Japanese and the local population, others who bargained
to retain control over their land by supporting the
Japanese, some who believed American troops would never
return, and the sincerely pro-Japanese.

The typical

Filipino and Moro inwardly ignored this party and only
pretended to obey it.

They saw too much Japanese terrorism

to believe in the goals of such a party.

Villagers saw

their prewar political leaders humiliated by the Japanese.
For example, a Japanese soldier forced a Filipino mayor to
climb a tree and get a coconut for him.18
From 1898 to 1911, Captain John J. Pershing's tactics
in his pacification of Mindanao's Moros were the opposite of
how the Japanese ruled the island in the Second World War.
His accomplishments bring Japanese errors into clearer
17Thomas, Asia for Asiatics. 10; Kuder, "The
Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 10
February 1945, 58; Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in
Mindanao (New York: Longman's Green and Co., 1946), 46.
18Charles Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance
Movement in the Philippines (New York: Vantage Press, 1972),
340-41; Erling Jonassen, Captain, U.S. Army (ret.) letter to
author, 3 July 1989; Robert Bowler, Colonel, U.S. Army
(ret.), letter to author, 30 September 1989.
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focus.

Over 700,000 Moros lived in the Cotabato, Bukidnon,

Lanao, and Zamboanga Provinces, and they were the only
people on the island to oppose the Americans.

Pershing knew

that Moro resistance was best overcome with minimum force
and a good understanding of Moro psychology.

He used road

construction, trading posts, and trade schools to calm Moro
fears of a harsh American occupation.

He also promised that

Americans would not try to Christianize them.19
The Japanese occupiers also had to contend with
Filipinos who were just as family-centered as the Moros.
Their population of 536,729 was concentrated on the western,
northern, and eastern coasts as well as Lanao Province.
Their cultural traditions obligated them to help their
immediate family of parents, brothers, and sisters as well
as their most distant relatives through any crisis.
Professional alliances and ritual relatives called
"compadres" added even more people to the group the Filipino
had to assist at all times.

He had to fight any outsider

who threatened this large network or lose his family's
respect and care.

This support system made Filipino

families very self-reliant.20
19Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1973), 23-193; Frank Vandiver, Black Jack
(College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1977),
142-314, 521-70.
20McGee, Rice and Salt. 150; Stanley Karnow, In Our
Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random
House, 1989), 20; Forbes, Philippine Islands 2:49; Teodoro
Agoncillo, A Short History of the Philippines (New York: New
American Library, 1969), 12-14.
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The Japanese threatened Filipino families with the
"neighborhood association."

Japanese troops made one man

responsible for each section of a city or village.

He had

to inform the Japanese secret police, the "Kempei Tai," of
all anti-Japanese activity or face the probability that the
Japanese would execute or kidnap his closest relatives.
This Filipino was usually so afraid that the Japanese would
discover unreported "crimes" in his village that he forced
his subordinates to spy on their own neighbors.

The

Japanese took advantage of family outcasts and bribed them
to turn in their neighbors and even their relatives.

The

Japanese imprisoned or executed these people along with
their families.

Because the Japanese forced some Filipinos

to betray their distant relatives in order to protect their
closest kin, this system made Filipinos hate the
Japanese.21
The Japanese supplemented the above attack on the
Filipino family with "zonification."

The Japanese chose a

collaborator to wear a mask before a lineup of suspects and
identify suspected guerrillas.

Because these spies usually

lived among the indigenous population, these traitors were
especially dangerous to the villagers and townspeople.
knew who had helped an American escape or who had spoken
21McGee, Rice and Salt. 150.
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badly of the Japanese.22
The "round up" was another direct Japanese attack on
the Filipino culture.

Because the most important matter to

the Japanese was to crush any resistance and learn of
information on threatening Filipino activities, their
commanders issued very vague rules concerning villager
welfare.

The smallest unit employed in this tactic was a

company of 100-200 troops.

The Japanese surrounded a

selected village before dawn.

At first light, the troops

moved into their assigned positions around the village.

The

Japanese kidnapped some men who were suspected of having
firearms.

The troops questioned their wives on their

husbands' activities.

If the Japanese did not get the

necessary information on the firearm owners, they massacred
the inhabitants.

Filipinos were naturally furious about

such brutality.23
The Japanese invasion broke down law and order in the
Surigao, Agusan, and Lanao Provinces.

The Japanese

destroyed the police force that had fought the banditry of
thieves and murderers before the war.

The Japanese did not

have a large enough garrison to control bandit violence.
There were many bloody fights between Filipino and Moro
22Jose Reyes, Terrorism and Redemption (Manila: n.p.,
1945), 17; Fertig to MacArthur, 20 December 1943, RG 16, Box
18, MA.
^Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, Southwest
Pacific Area Enemy Publications, "Intelligence Work and
Round Up," 13 August 1944, RG 3, Box 129, MA.
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bandits near Kolambugan in the Lanao Province.

Moros

attacked and drove out Filipino Catholics near Malabang.

A

Filipino Catholic policeman responded to this by killing an
unknown number of Moros.

Filipino Catholics killed 200

Moros in Cotabato province.

Ex-soldiers led bandit gangs

which terrorized many villages in Surigao and Agusan
provinces.

Such unrest frightened many law-abiding

Filipinos and Moros.24
Because the Japanese did not learn from America's less
violent method forty years earlier that Mindanaoan
cooperation could best be attained with a good application
of psychology and with minimum force, the Japanese garrison
applied a violent and ineffective pacification policy.

The

island's Filipinos and Moros were very family-centered and
ready to defend their relatives against indigenous or
foreign enemies with guerrilla warfare.

Moros had fought

the Americans until they were satisfied that the Americans
were not a threat to their culture.

The brutal actions of

the Japanese in 1942 caused the Filipino and Moro hatred
that quickly precipitated a guerrilla war Japanese leaders
wanted to avoid.

Japanese soldiers therefore overreacted to

24Robert Spielman, "The History of the 114th Infantry
Regiment" (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1953), 19-22;
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 130-36; Melinick, Philippine
Diary. 241-45; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39;
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA;
Joseph Kuder, "Kuder Report," Hayden Papers [hereafter HP],
Box 41, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor [hereafter UM]; Jonassen letter; Bowler letter;
Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New
York: Bantam Books, 1980), 69-98.
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their fears of resistance and created a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

t
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CHAPTER 2
SEVEN GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE FORMED

Popular anger required organization under leaders if
it was to be converted to coordinated resistance among the
Mindanaoans.

Proper organization was the best way to insure

that people performed important tasks and worked towards a
common goal of attaining greater security from bandits and
Japanese troops.

Peasants also needed leaders to train them

to shoot guns if they were to kill enough bandits and
Japanese to protect their villages.

If Filipinos were to

survive outside Japanese-controlled areas, they needed civil
governments that preserved law and solved food shortages by
assigning certain people to try and jail criminals as well
as ordering other people to plant food.
After May 1942, Mindanaoans responded to the Japanese
threats to their society with resistance.

The Japanese

garrison was deployed in major cities along Mindanao's coast
with the largest contingent at Davao.

The Mindanaoans faced

a harsh Japanese occupation and indigenous banditry which
angered them.

Former superintendents, officers, and foremen

became the officers and sergeants of these first resistance
groups.

Soldiers who did not surrender added their training

to these groups when they taught them the tactic of
simultaneous fire.

A few men from many villages throughout
23
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the island collected discarded and hidden guns and ambushed
small Japanese groups.

Since farmers, stevedores, soldiers,

and construction workers were accustomed to group activity,
they made the best guerrillas.

Some leaders trained their

volunteers for one to two months.1
Because the different guerrilla groups lacked overall
control, they sometimes fought over territory and cultural
differences.

Some Lanao Province Moro guerrillas fought

with Filipinos over land.

Such activities started feuds

between the small guerrilla bands and diverted them from
fighting the Japanese.

In Lanao Province, many Moro

guerrilla groups refused to assist other Moros and
especially Christians against the Japanese.

Such

animosities drove an even deeper wedge between existing Moro
and Filipino guerrillas.

The guerrilla leaders lacked

authority to convince their men to concentrate on fighting
the Japanese.2
From May to December 1942, several guerrilla leaders
formed large guerrilla units to fight the Japanese troops
and local bandits.

All of them were strong-willed men who

convinced leaders of smaller guerrilla groups to come under
their command.
1Royce Wendover, "Foreshadows," The Royce Wendover
Papers [hereafter WP], U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania [hereafter CB].
2Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 130-36; "Kuder Report,"
HP, Box 41, UM; Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16,
Box 1, M A .
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Salipada Pendatun, a Moro religious leader, understood
the different cultures extant among the people and he had an
excellent background for leading a large resistance force in
the Cotabato Province.

He administered Moslem universal law

to hundreds of his followers.

Pendatun used passages from

the Koran to justify a war against the Japanese, and he
maintained his religious leadership through spiritual and
physical bravery in different tribal feuds.

Furthermore, by

his powerful personality Pendatun became very skillful in
forming alliances.3 Pendatun also learned how to work with
Americans and Filipinos at the University of the Philippines
Law School.

This experience later helped him lead Filipinos

and Americans, who came from very different cultures.
Military training in the University of the Philippines and
wartime service in Davao Province, taught him basic military
leadership skills.
Pendatun used family support to build a resistance
group in the summer and fall of 1942.

His brothers-in-law,

who were also Moslem priests (Datus), joined his guerrilla
force.

Peasant families under these Datus were obligated

under their law to stick together and fight under their
strong leaders.

One of the brothers-in-law was reputed to

be one of the most influential leaders in Southeast
Cotabato.

As a result, these peasants gave Pendatun's men

3Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 49; Kiefer, Tausuq.
71-83.
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shelter, food, recruits, and information on the Japanese.4
Pendatun needed a victory to gain more local support
and show his men that the Japanese could be defeated.
Because Fort Pikit in Cotabato Province was lightly
garrisoned and distant from the main Japanese bases on the
Lanao and Davao coasts, he chose it as the site for such a
victory.

If the guerrillas captured Fort Pikit, they would

cut the only east-west road on Mindanao.

Japanese loss of

control of this road, Highway One, would mean that the their
Cotabato Province garrison would be isolated from the bases
at Davao and Cagayan.

If such a main road were cut, the

guerrillas and peasants in Cotabato Province would be safer.
Japanese patrols would have to use trails to bypass
roadblocks on Highway One the guerrillas could easily
ambush.

Since these Cotabato Moros would consider his

actions brave, Pendatun realized that killing some Japanese
would increase support from other Cotabato Province tribes
even if he failed to capture Fort Pikit.

If the Japanese

killed many Moros, this would also elicit more family
vengeance against the enemy.
The attack was a success.

Thanks to peasant guides

who led the guerrillas safely down secret trails, about 200
guerrillas attacked the garrison in August 1942 and
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Kuder, "The
Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 17
February 1945, 85; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 49; Robert
Merchant, Lieutenant, U.S. Army, (ret.), letter to author, 2
October 1989; Kiefer, Tausug, 60-65.
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overwhelmed it from many directions at once.

Because the

victory demonstrated Pendatun's power and encouraged the
local peasants' desire to get revenge for the abuse they
suffered, they joined him.

Pendatun was tolerant of other

cultures and he welcomed Filipino Catholics and Americans
into his guerrilla force.

His fame grew so large that 500

Filipinos who fought Cotabato Province Moros before the war
joined his force.

Several unsurrendered American officers

and enlisted men who lived in the jungle since May 1942 also
joined Pendatun and contributed their staff and combat
skills.

Four Army Air Forces enlisted men who were

experienced with infantry weapon maintenance, repaired
machine guns and rifles.
vehicles.

Other U.S. soldiers repaired

Lieutenant Colonel Frank McGee, U.S. Army, joined

Pendatun as a subordinate.

He was a very experienced

infantry officer with combat experience in World War I and
the Battle for Mindanao and helped Pendatun plan nis
military operations.5
The Piang and Sinsuat clans were pre-war political
rivals and both families remained hostile to each other
during the Japanese occupation.

Datu Sinsuat was the most

important Japanese collaborator in the Cotabato Province.
This situation turned the Piang family and their allies, who
controlled the entire province, except the lower Cotabato
5Jack Samples, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.),
letter to author, 30 September 1989; Merchant letter;
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Kiefer, Tausug,
52-59, 121-34.
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River Valley and the west coast, against the Japanese.

Many

members of the Piang family decided to join or help the
guerrillas in order to fight the Sinsuat Clan.

After

Pendatun received support from the Piang clan, most of the
Moros in Cotabato Province supported Pendatun; so, he had
greater security from enemy patrols and he had more recruits
for his combat force.6
Pendatun's power reached its zenith when he expanded
his control over Highway One in Central Mindanao in late
1942.

This highway ran from Cotabato City to Davao City.

His men surprised the enemy at Kabacan and gave Pendatun
control of the junction of the Sayre Road and Highway One,
the best roads on Mindanao.

Pendatun then overwhelmed five

more small Japanese bases on Mindanao.
increased his stature and support.

These

successes

By January 1943, his

force numbered 2,000 guerrillas, which made it almost as
large as a U.S. regiment.

He used his military training to

set up a staff section to control this force.7
Pendatun prepared to assault his biggest objective,
Malaybalay City in Bukidnon Province in January 1943.
Because he wanted to replenish his low ammunition stocks
with captured enemy supplies, he decided to capture Japanese
6Dionisio Guterrez to General Basilio Valdez, 24 May
1943, HP, Box 42, UM; MacArthur to Fertig, 29 September
1943, RG 16, MA; Ralph Thomas, "Muslim but Filipino: The
Integration of Philippine Muslims 1917-1946,"
(Ph.D. diss.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1971), 258.
7Jesus Villamor, They Never Surrendered (Quezon City,
Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982), 144.
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equipment at Malaybalay.

Pendatun sent units of unknown

strength to positions north and south of Malaybalay to
ambush enemy troops who tried to rescue their comrades.
Since the route the enemy would use, the Sayre Road, was
only 20 feet wide and overgrown, the guerrillas easily set
up ambushes there.
From January to March 1943, Pendatun launched his
attacks on Malaybalay with great determination and
ingenuity.

The enemy was well-armed with machine guns and

other heavy weapons but the guerrillas temporarily overcame
this with an amazing series of homemade weapons.

The

guerrillas took a 50-caliber machine gun from a crashed
Japanese plane and used it to support the guerrilla assault.
Guerrillas engaged Japanese-held buildings with dynamite and
glass bombs wrapped in vines.

They even salvaged bombs from

a deserted U.S. airfield and catapulted them into Japanese
lines.

These weapons enabled Pendatun's men to surround the

remainder of the garrison in a schoolhouse in the city's
center by March 1943.

However, superior Japanese firepower

wore the guerrillas down so much that by the time they
reached the schoolhouse they were too weak to capture it.
Because the guerrillas assaulted the Japanese across streets
that did not give them as much cover to surprise the enemy
as the jungle, the guerrillas suffered more casualties.
Pendatun's men used their makeshift weapons well, but
replacement of casualties took time which the Japanese used
to fortify their building and wait for reinforcements.
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6 March, the guerrillas were so weak that 35 Japanese were
able to break through guerrilla lines and reinforce the
schoolhouse.

Because it was obvious that his force would be

subject to punishing enemy attacks if he remained, Pendatun
retreated and consolidated his strength in Southern Bukidnon
and Cotabato.

Since the peasants considered Pendatun's

attack brave, his popular support did not weaken.8
Police Lieutenant Colonel Claro Lauretta was another
important guerrilla leader with an excellent background for
resistance warfare in Davao Province.

He was a graduate of

the Philippine Military Academy where he learned basic
leadership and combat skills.

Lauretta also served with the

Philippine Constabulary before the war.

He gained valuable

combat experience when he fought the Japanese during their
invasion of Mindanao.

Lauretta refused to surrender in May

1942 and he gathered 2,000 Davao City refugees in the hills
20 miles north of the city.
In the summer of 1942, Lauretta's refugee community
faced the most potentially dangerous Japanese garrison on
Mindanao.

The enemy's airfields and port at Davao City were

staging areas for Japanese offensives in the South and
Southwest Pacific; so, it housed a 1,500-man garrison.
Thousands of Japanese troops also passed through the port on
8Samples letter; Jonassen letter; Samuel Grashio,
Colonel, U.S. Air Force, (ret.), letter to author, 18 June
1989; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine (Garden City,
New York; Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945), 85-86.
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their way to the Southwest Pacific.
From May 1942 to June 1943, Lauretta established a
very tight security arrangement to warn him of any Japanese
operations; so, that his people could evacuate if danger
became real.

His 30 riflemen from a former police unit

enforced law and order among the 2,000 peasants.
men also repulsed Filipino bandit attacks.

Lauretta's

He used a series

of outposts on every trail that led to the Japanese garrison
which passed him information on the direction and location
of enemy patrols that searched for guerrillas.

This system

made the Japanese easy to intercept and ambush before they
reached the refugees.

Lauretta's men treated strangers as

if they were spies unless they quickly proved otherwise.
His men enhanced security when they restricted farming to
areas nearby so that nobody could be captured and give away
the guerrilla locations.9
Lauretta surrounded his villages with observation
posts which alerted them to any danger.

Because the peasant

refugees joined his force as spies and riflemen, his small
32-man force grew to 1,000 men.

Lauretta ordered some of

his men to infiltrate the Filipino stevedore group at the
Davao port where Japanese ships were loaded.

Since they

worked in the center of the Japanese garrison, they gave him
9Rex Blow, Major, Australian Army, (ret.) letter to
author, 1 September 1989; Mellnick, Philippine Diarv.
243-47; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 542; Grashio and
Norling, Return to Freedom. 115.
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valuable information on enemy strength and plans.

Because

the jungle was so dense, Japanese troops patrolled trails
and waterways.

Guerrillas set up their ambushes along

trails and bivouac sites where they could surprise Japanese
patrols.

Japanese troops usually did not have time to

deploy and shoot their ambushers, so the guerrillas either
chased them away or killed them.

After an ambush, the

Filipinos split up in different directions.

If the Japanese

survivors divided their patrol into small groups to capture
the guerrillas, they would become disoriented and
vulnerable.

Lauretta's men gained such a fearsome

reputation that Japanese prisoner-of-war camp guards at
Davao were afraid to go deep into the jungle.10
Captain Louis Morgan, a Catholic Filipino guerrilla
leader who was also half American and a police company
commander built a guerrilla force from his company in Lanao
Province.

Morgan had served in the Lanao Province before

the May 1942 surrender.

After the surrender, he found other

Filipinos and convinced them to join him.

His 500 men spent

most of their time protecting Filipinos near Kolambugan City
from Moro bandit raids.

Morgan massacred Moro villages

instead of negotiating a solution through the local Datus,
and so worsened Filipino-Moro relations.

Due to his hatred

of Moros, the guerrilla force was unable to form alliances
10Hawkins, Never Sav Die. 84-133; Grashio and Norling,
Return to Freedom. 122; Blow letter; "Evacuee Report of
Lieutenant Commander Melvin McCoy," RG 16, Box 45, MA.
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in the Moro-dominated province.
Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig was another major
guerrilla leader who gained a very important background for
guerrilla warfare on Mindanao during his prewar civilian
employment as an engineer in the Philippines.

He had a

Reserve Officer Training Corps commission earned at the
Colorado School of Mines.

Ke traveled throughout the

islands for five years and he met many Filipinos.

Fertig

entered active service in the U.S. Army in June 1941 as an
airfield construction inspector.

He traveled all over the

archipelago, including Mindanao.

This experience gave him a

relatively good insight to Filipino and Moro culture that
someone who had not lived in the Philippines would not have
had.

Fertig realized that Filipinos and Moros valued

personal rather than institutional loyalty.

He observed how

Catholic Filipinos reacted in various jobs at the mines in
his reserve engineer unit and in his home.

Fertig still

felt somewhat condescending towards Filipinos.

He believed

that the moderate climate made them lazy and dependent on
Americans for leadership.11
During the 1941-42 Philippine Campaign, Fertig served
under Brigadier General Hugh Casey, MacArthur's chief
engineer, on Luzon and Corregidor Island.

Fertig flew from

Corregidor to Mindanao in March 1942 during the fall of the
Philippines.

Since no space was left on the last plane that

11,,Evacuee Report by Wendell Fertig," RG 16, Box 44,
MA; "Evacuee Report of Ellwood Ofrett," RG 16, Box 44, MA.
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left for Australia, he remained on the island.

He met a

prewar friend, Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army, and they
traveled around the island looking for a U.S. unit to join.
After Fertig and Hedges heard of Wainwright's surrender at
Corregidor and Sharp's surrender on Mindanao, they traveled
on foot in Lanao Province and evaded Japanese patrols with
the help of Filipinos and Moros who hid and fed them.
A combination of factors drove Fertig to organize a
guerrilla force.

He was grateful to the many peasants who

risked their lives to take care of him, and he was angry
that they were being treated so badly by the Japanese.

He

was furious at the Japanese who abused U.S. prisoners in a
mock Fourth of July 1942 parade in Lanao Province.

Police

Captain William Tate, a Filipino who was half-American and a
member of Morgan's guerrilla force, told Fertig that Morgan
had organized 500 men into a guerrilla force.

Fertig

considered such a unit large enough to make guerrilla
warfare feasible.

Fertig also knew that Filipinos and Moros

had been good guerrillas in the early years of the U.S.
occupation from 1898 to 1911.12
Japanese troops were concentrated in coastal areas of
Lanao and Misamis Occidental Provinces to defend ports that
linked their shipping lanes to the Southwest Pacific.
Because these enemy garrisons did not have enough men to
constantly patrol the island's interior, guerrillas like
12Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 36-103.
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Fertig lived in relative security.

Large Japanese bases

were in Lanao Province and smaller garrisons were kept at
Zamboanga City and Misamis City.

Japanese garrisons did not

patrol more than a few miles from their cities.

The Misamis

City garrison only contained three Japanese who were
probably recruiting Filipino policemen.

Obviously, the

Japanese did not consider this province very important.

The

Lanao Province garrison amounted to a total of 800 men.

A

number of Japanese occupied Zamboanga City but the rest of
Zamboanga Province was free of Japanese.13
From July to September 1942, Fertig established his
authority over Captain Morgan's men.

Morgan had wanted

Fertig to be the titular commander of his 500 men while
Morgan secretly retained actual control.

While he agreed to

be Fertig's Chief of Staff, Morgan believed that he could
get more Filipinos to join his guerrilla force by using
Fertig's senior rank as a magnet.

Because Fertig inspected

Morgan's men and he demanded staff reports from Morgan and
his assistants, Morgan's guerrillas learned to respect
Fertig.

Morgan's men saw Fertig, not Morgan, making policy;

so, this action was a challenge to Morgan's power.

Fertig

knew about Morgan's violent past with the Moros and believed
that all Morgan planned to do was fight Moros in Lanao
Province instead of Japanese.

Fertig was determined to gain

13|'Brief Tentative Report on Conditions in the Tenth
Military District," 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Keats,
They Fought Alone. 81-110; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
335-67.
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control over Morgan's men.

Fertig lied that he was a

Brigadier General who was sent by MacArthur to lead a
guerrilla movement.

Since many Filipinos considered

MacArthur a legendary figure due to his defense of
Corregidor, Fertig's prestige rose.

Morgan overestimated

his strength in his following, and he did not pay attention
to Fertig's growing power.
The opportunity for further expansion of guerrilla
power came in September 1942.

Japanese troops continued to

remain in or near their garrisons in Lanao and Cagayan
Provinces; so, they did not present an obstacle to the
expansion of Fertig's force.

Tate and 37 men sailed across

Illigan Bay to Misamis Occidental Province and killed three
Japanese policemen who probably were trying to organize a
pro-Japanese police force.

Because Fertig gained a larger

peasant support base there, gaining Misamis Occidental
Province was a very important event in the development of
resistance strength.

This extra area gave his organization

more volunteers and food.14
From September 1942 to March 1943, Fertig set up a
civil government in Eastern Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental
Provinces to fulfill the people's basic needs.

Fertig

restored prewar mayors and province governors to their
14United States Forces in the Philippines, HQ Tenth
Military District, Office of the Commanding Officer to the
Commander in Chief SWPA, 28 September 1943, RG 16, Box 12,
MA; Reverend Patrick O'Connor to Dr. O'Dwyer, 5 March 1943,
St. Columban's Archives, Bellview, Nebraska; Keats, They
Fought Alone. 91-103.
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previous positions.

The civil government worked strenuously

to assist areas which suffered from shortages in important
crops to receive supplies of those crops from other areas
with surpluses.

The resistance established an elaborate

supply system of trails, work animals, and laborers which
kept the supplies moving.

Fertig's civil government held

prices to prewar levels that allowed the average peasant to
buy enough rice or corn to feed his family.

Since money

gave Filipinos an alternative to barter, the Fertig's
officials made this currency with crude printing presses to
ease trade for the population.

By March 1943,

resistance-controlled areas functioned almost like they did
before the war.15
Peasants and townspeople showed their gratitude by
working for the resistance.

Women rubbed brass against

stone to make bullet cartridges while men enlisted in the
combat units.

Peasants distilled alcohol from coconut and

tuba plants and made it into propulsion fuel for trucks and
water launches.

Bar girls, farmers, and stevedores near

enemy garrisons in Lanao and Cagayan told the resistance
what enemy activity they saw.

Such volunteers were also an

important replacement pool for casualties suffered in combat
with the Japanese.

As long as this popular support

continued, the Japanese had to kill every Filipino in
15Jonassen letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
335-67.
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Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental Provinces if they were to
destroy the resistance.

Because Japanese resources were

scattered all over the Far East and the Pacific fighting the
British, Australians, Chinese, and the Americans, this was
quite impossible.

One peasant stated his lack of concern

for Japanese attacks by uttering that even 4,000 Japanese
could not find him among forty million trees.

Because

Mindanao was 94,600 square kilometers in area and covered
with jungle, this peasant's statement was no mere boast.16
By May 1943, Fertig organized the combat arm of the
resistance in the Western Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental
Provinces.

Fertig was determined, however, not to attack

the Japanese garrisons.

He spent from September 1942 to

June 1943 preparing his men to defend against a Japanese
offensive, and he established a peasant spy network that
extended to the nearest Japanese garrisons in the Lanao and
Misamis Oriental Provinces to warn him of a Japanese attack.
He hoped to make radio contact with MacArthur in Australia
and receive more weapons for even greater security.

He

established a complete staff to delegate his orders to the
resistance.

Fertig sent Morgan on an expedition around

Zamboanga and Northern Mindanao to gather more volunteers.
Because a military system had a complete chain of command
16Kuder, "The Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday
Evening Post. 17 February 1945, 86; Japanese Monograph No.
3, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, December
1942 to June 1944," U.S. Army Center of Military History,
Washington, D.C. [hereafter CMH].
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for efficient transmission of orders, Fertig organized his
3,747 men into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and
regiments.

Fertig's men conducted their training with

captured Japanese weapons.

Since the men

were not all

former soldiers and because sergeants andofficers with
combat experience were rare, Fertig and his officers knew
that the Filipinos would be best at ambushes and not in long
battles.

Because resistance warfare was based on

squad-sized ambushes and rapid retreats to assembly areas,
this fighting style would later avoid thehigh casualties of
company and battalion level combat in which his men werenot
trained.

According to a wartime Japanese document, the

targets for Japanese "subjugative" operations for 1943 in
the Philippines were resistance bases and radios.

The

Japanese garrison commander of Mindanao probably believed
that such missions required months to find resistance
targets and assemble enough force to launch them.

This gave

Fertig some time to organize his forces.17
Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army, Reserve, was
another important guerrilla leader in Lanao Province who had
a good background for organizing guerrilla warfare on
Mindanao.

He had several years of prewar service experience

on the island during which he worked for a Lanao Province
logging company.

Hedges met many Moros and understood their

17Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA;
Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record,
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH.
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strong loyalties to their local Datus.
important Moro leaders on Mindanao.

He also knew several

Moros would respect

Hedges' forceful personality.
During the fall of 1942, Moro resistance to the
Japanese in Lanao was divided along clan lines and thus
uncoordinated; so, Hedges faced a difficult task in uniting
significant numbers of Moros.

Moros responded to the

Japanese murders and abuse of family members as well as
intrusions on their land by forming guerrilla bands which
ambushed enemy patrols.

For example, when 129 Japanese

troops fired on the Moro village of Tamparan in September
1942, the Moros surrounded and killed 128 Japanese.

The

Moros destroyed another Japanese patrol in the same area.

A

Moro guerrilla band showed its fighting skill when it laid
siege to the enemy's Ganassi Village garrison in Lanao.
They remained so close to the enemy lines that Japanese
planes could not bomb or strafe them.

Yet these scattered

bands were based solely on village and family loyalties that
also turned into feuds after ambushes were complete; so, the
resistance was not long-lasting.

Moro society was a web of

alliances among different families which shifted constantly,
and this kept the culture from destroying itself in civil
war.

They could have assumed that the Japanese would be too

afraid to return after a successful Moro ambush; so, their
old feuds became more important.

Their hatred of Filipinos

persisted and it complicated relationships between their
guerrilla groups.

Unifying Lanao required careful
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leadership to overcome these complex problems or the
province resistance effort would be uncoordinated.18
Because Hedges established a good relationship with
the Datus from September 1942 to May 1943, he accomplished
unification despite the fact that he was an outsider.

He

placed members of feuding families as well as Moros and
Catholics in separate guerrilla units in order to avoid
internal fights.

Hedges appointed Datus to command their

respective followers to demonstrate his respect for their
authority.

Thomas Cabili, a prewar Lanao Province

politician, and Edward Kuder, a former school teacher in
Lanao, gave Hedges important advice concerning those Moro
leaders who were trustworthy.

Hedges demonstrated the type

of showmanship Moros admired in a leader by keeping his
headquarters within a few miles of a Japanese camp and by
showing his skillful marksmanship.

He helped set up

effective civil government to meet Moro needs and security.
His men arrested or killed bandits so that the civil
government could be established and function smoothly.
Enemy foraging patrols caused a food shortage but the civil
officials arranged for surplus food to ba redistributed from
other provinces.

The Moros reciprocated Hedges for these

considerations by supplying his guerrillas with food, spies
and recruits.

The Moros were impressed with Hedges'

understanding of their culture and his constant
18"Kuder Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Kiefer, Tausua.
28-65.
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demonstrations that he was tough but fair.

By May 1943,

Hedges controlled almost 2,000 men.19
Major Robert Bowler, U.S. Army, was another pioneer
guerrilla leader with a good understanding of Mindanao's
cultures gained from a year of prewar service on the island.
Bowler was a Regular Army officer and an instructor with the
Filipino units before the war.

He learned about the key

trails, cities, local politicians, and Catholic Filipino and
Moro soldiers who would later join his guerrilla force.
During the battle for Mindanao he became a battalion
commander who successfully led his men against the first
enemy landings until his positions were outflanked.
Bowler's commander ordered him to take his battalion to the
Bukidnon Province for a last stand.

After traveling through

the jungle for nearly a month, Bowler and his men learned of
Wainwright's surrender.

Bowler was determined not to

surrender himself or his command, so he released his men to
return to their homes.

He faced considerable danger from

Japanese patrols, so he constantly hid among friendly
Filipinos.

The Talakag Village peasants hid him and any

other American who entered the village from many Japanese
patrols.

On one occasion, Bowler hid only 400 meters from a

Japanese outpost.

These experiences made him a tough but

flexible-minded officer who knew how to lead men of a
different nationality.
19Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 533-34; "Kuder
Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Samples letter; Grashio letter.
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Japanese control of Bowler's area in the Misamis
Oriental and Bukidnon Provinces was not very firm during the
Autumn of 1942.

Their main garrison which contained 275 men

was at Cagayan in Misamis Oriental Province while a smaller
unit of 190 troops was in the Bukidnon Province.

They

established smaller outposts nearby to collect food and
taxes from the local population.

Enemy troops needed the

Sayre Road to reach Davao and Cotabato provinces, and they
built outposts along this road to protect their truck
convoys.
Bowler proved his courage and gratitude to the Talakag
villagers.

Unsurrendered Filipino soldiers and sergeants

dug up hidden arms caches and found seventy men for Bowler.
They asked Bowler to lead them in a guerrilla war.

Bowler's

seventy guerrillas drove the Japanese out of Talakag.

After

the battle, the Filipino policemen, whom the Japanese had
tried to train, joined the guerrillas.

In addition, the

Talakag townspeople voted to make Bowler their leader.

Due

to his justifiable belief in the great danger of savage
Japanese reprisals on civilians, Bowler was very reluctant
to wage guerrilla warfare.

If the Japanese considered

Bowler's guerrillas a threat, they could have increased
their inland patrols and killed more Filipinos.

Because

townspeople were so furious about the enemy atrocities and
because they had confidence in Bowler, they were adamant
about continuing to fight the Japanese.

Therefore, he

restricted guerrilla activities to small ambushes to satisfy
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their need for vengeance until he could contact U.S. forces.
Because of the possibility of even small ambushes triggering
more Japanese patrols, Bowler planned to disperse his
guerrillas during such an enemy offensive.

He believed his

guerrillas' future mission in the war effort was
intelligence gathering to assist returning U.S. forces.
Even if his ambushes provoked a Japanese offensive, Bowler's
men could still collect information on the Japanese as long
as they dispersed and at least one leader remained alive to
analyze it.
Bowler's men established a good relationship with the
peasants.

They respected private property and reestablished

a civil government.

Bowler's guerrillas bought their

supplies with their manufactured currency or goods.

Patrols

watched Japanese garrisons and warned the peasants of any
approaching soldiers.
ambushes.

Bowler restricted operations to small

After the Japanese left the area, peasants

returned to their homes.

Because Bowler restrained

guerrilla activity so much that his men were not perceived
as a threat by the Japanese, large Japanese patrols did not
disrupt peasant life.20
Bowler and his men gained such a good reputation from
their liberation of Talakag that more Filipinos joined him.
Former soldiers and local peasants brought guns and
ammunition with them to fight the Japanese.

By October

20Bowler letter; Jonassen letter; Haggerty, Guerrilla
Padre, 52-60.
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1942, Bowler commanded at least 500 guerrillas who were fed
by the local population in northern Bukidnon Province and
Misamis Oriental Province.21
Major Ernest McClish, a Regular Army officer, was
another early guerrilla leader in the Surigao and Agusan
Provinces with extensive knowledge of the indigenous culture
gained from long service in the Philippines.

He honed his

combat skills with the elite 57th Filipino Scout Regiment.
When the U.S. Army gave McClish a training command with the
81st Filipino Division, he gained further experience in
working with Filipinos.

He learned how to lead Filipinos

with an effective combination of tact and decisiveness.
McClish did not have an arrogant attitude towards Filipino
culture which allowed him to be open-minded in his
conversations with Filipinos.

McClish's service as a

battalion commander during the Japanese invasion of Mindanao
gave him important combat experience.

He refused to

surrender and spent months dodging Japanese patrols.
McClish's experiences on Mindanao gave him the necessary
understanding of the indigenous culture to communicate with
the local population and the combat experience to lead men
in battle.
McClish was appalled at the indigenous banditry and
Japanese brutality after the May 1942 surrender.

He was

determined to protect the population with a guerrilla force.
21Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 41-65; Bowler Letter.
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Due to widespread banditry, he faced a serious challenge in
organizing resistance in the Surigao and Agusan Provinces.
Banditry threatened to stifle resistance to the Japanese.
The Japanese were naturally content with the situation and
only maintained 160 men in Butuan City in Agusan Province
and 120 in Surigao Province.

Since Japan did not send food

to her garrisons, the Japanese troops in Agusan and Surigao
would continue to steal Filipino crops in the area if they
were not stopped by guerrilla resistance.
McClish had a charismatic personality that quickly
impressed local guerrilla leaders and earned their loyalty.
He convinced two guerrilla leaders near Claveria village to
come under his command and McClish gained 1,000 men.

A

Syrian mining engineer named Khalil Khador organized 900 mer.
and joined him.

McClish realized that harsher methods would

be necessary to defeat bandits; so, he had one of his best
officers organize a 200-man company for this task.

They

arrested or killed so many bandit leaders in late 1942 and
early 1943 that McClish's power was solidified and peasant
security increased.

McClish's guerrillas recruited many

bandits after the guerrillas arrested their leaders.
Because McClish's men were spread among the Agusan and
Surigao villages, his supply system was very decentralized.
If McClish gathered his 1,900-man force in one small area it
would have eased supply problems but it also would have
alarmed the Japanese.

McClish's men were a serious threat

to the Butuan garrison consisting of 300 Japanese troops.
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Unless the guerrillas remained scattered most of the time,
they were vulnerable to counterattacks from Japanese troops
from Davao and reinforcements that could have landed at
Butuan to eliminate them.

The guerrillas bought or traded

for their food and clothing from the nearest villages.
McClish's staff included supply personnel who found and
distributed arms and ammunition that U.S. and Filipino
soldiers buried before their surrender. Because they
immediately issued whatever they received to the guerrillas,
these men did not burden themselves with cumbersome records
or storage facilities.

This prevented surprise enemy raids

from capturing their supplies and the staff was free to
escape without trying to carry anything away.
Because McClish believed that killing Japanese was the
best way to convince the local population that his
guerrillas were not bandits who accepted peasant food and
did nothing to protect them, he decided to attack the
Japanese garrison at Butuan.

Since the Japanese would be

able to quickly reinforce Butuan by sea if they so desired,
great dangers were involved in such an operation.

McClish

realized this and planned to send his 1,900 men against it
from four sides and eliminate the Japanese before they could
be reinforced.

This was a reasonable estimate considering

that only 300 Japanese opposed his forces.

Clearing the

garrison would also bring the guerrillas greater control of
the Agusan River which could be used for more farming and
increased transportation, unless the Japanese returned to
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Butaun.

McClish also had to respect the understandable

Filipino need for vengeance against the garrison which stole
their crops and terrorized them.

If he forgot or ignored

the indigenous population's wishes, his popular support
could have disappeared.
McClish's men launched a determined attack on Butuan,
but they were not armed or trained for combat against
fortified positions.

The guerrillas assaulted the town in

April 1943 from opposite sides and overwhelmed the outer
defenses.

The fighting was so fierce on the first day that

most of the town was on fire.

Because some guerrillas were

not used to such constant fighting, they ran away.

The

Japanese withdrew into a brick schoolhouse and fortified it
against a siege until their reinforcements arrived.

The

enemy used heavy fire from narrow gun ports to hold off the
guerrilla assaults.

McClishSs men lacked the mortars and

machine guns with high rates of fire required to defeat the
Japanese.

Japanese reinforcements arrived with air support

and on the ninth day they drove out the guerrillas.22
Because the local population considered the guerrilla
attack brave, McClish still retained popular support.

The

Filipinos realized that McClish's men were willing to
sacrifice themselves for their safety and not simply live
off of their generosity in idleness.

Such respect meant

22Clyde Childress, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army,
(ret.), letter to author, 17 November 1989; Grashio letter;
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39.
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more volunteers and food for McClish to strengthen his
force.

Guerrilla fortunes increased when the Butuan

garrison totally evacuated the city.

The Japanese

evacuation was probably intended to consolidate their
strength for a 1943 summer offensive in Western Mindanao to
destroy Fertig's guerrillas, but the peasants considered the
Japanese evacuation a guerrilla victory.23
There were two other significant guerrilla leaders.
James Grinstead was a World War I veteran.

Before the war,

he trained Filipino policemen and hunted Moro and Catholic
Filipino bandits on Mindanao.
plantation manager.

Grinstead later became a

Because this background on Mindanao

gave Grinstead the ability to know enough about Filipino
culture to be fair to his men, he recruited a number of
guerrillas in Bukidnon Province after the May 1942
surrender.

The other was Khalil Khador whose father had

sent him to run his mines in the Agusan Province before the
war.

Khador was a tough man who used his powerful

personality to intimidate 900 of his miners to join the
^Jonassen letter; Childress letter; Austin Shofner,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, (ret.), letter to
author, 4 December 1989; Paul Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Army (ret.), phone call, October 1, 1989; Grashio
letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA;
United States Forces in the Philippines HQ, Tenth Military
District in the Field to the Commanding General Southwest
Pacific Forces, 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box l, MA; Willoughby,
Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39; Hawkins, Never Sav Die.
171-180; Ingham, Rendezvous. 63; Keats, They Fought Alone.
221-24. The author could not find any Japanese documents on
this withdrawal. McClish's organization did not suffer from
a decrease in popular support, a sign that the Filipinos
considered the result a guerrilla victory.
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guerrillas.24
Because the most important seven American and
Mindanaoan leaders, except Morgan, understood the
family-centered indigenous culture and they knew how to
convince the population that organized guerrilla warfare was
the best way to protect their families against the Japanese,
they were able to organize resistance in their separate
areas.

When the guerrilla leaders killed Japanese patrols,

warned villagers of their approach, and drove away bandits,
they proved their worth to the local population.

Filipinos

and Moros repaid the resistance with food, shelter,
recruits, and intelligence on Japanese activity.
24Jonassen letter; Robert Spielman, Captain, U.S.
Army, (ret.), telephone conversation, 20 June 1990;
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 538.
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CHAPTER 3
ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE MINDANAO RESISTANCE

The Mindanao resistance had to become partisans under
MacArthur if it was going to play a significant role in the
Southwest Pacific Area.

Once a clear chain of command

stretched from MacArthur through one island commander to the
individual resistance members, the guerrillas would become
partisans.

Fertig was determined to accomplish this.

Because Fertig believed that a unified resistance would give
Mindanaoans the most power to fight their Japanese
occupiers, he wanted to take control over all of the
guerrilla groups.

Guerrilla leaders who feared losing the

authority they worked hard to attain, as well as other
leaders who tried to usurp Fertig's authority over the
island's resistance for greater personal power, made it
difficult for Fertig to establish his control over the
island.

Because he was an American, Fertig faced potential

indigenous resentment if he tried t-o attain control of
Filipino and Moro guerrilla leaders.

Due to Mindanao's

rugged terrain, Fertig would be unable to meet and
personally convince some of the independent guerrilla
leaders to join him.

Fertig had to convince these leaders

that his command would help them kill more Japanese, and he
had to neutralize his opposition without starting a civil
51
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war, if he was to unify resistance.
In February 1943, Fertig used a "home made" radio to
contact MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters
(hereafter SWPA HQ) in Australia.

In early 1943, SWPA HQ

knew very little about any of the resistance groups in the
Philippines.

Because of the potential civil wars that could

erupt on the islands over authority, SWPA HQ considered it
imperative that it give the strongest leaders official
authority.

Because Fertig worked for Brigadier General Hugh

Casey before and during the Philippine Campaign and since
Casey was still MacArthur's chief engineer, Casey probably
convinced MacArthur that Fertig was fit to command the
Mindanao resistance.

It is not clear if SWPA HQ knew that

other commanders like Bowler and McClish were still alive.
MacArthur gave Fertig official command of the Mindanao
resistance in February 1943.

In March, MacArthur sent four

tons of supplies by submarine and an officer, Lieutenant
Commander Charles Parsons, U.S. Naval Reserve, to confirm
that Fertig was a good commander.

Parsons had lived in the

Philippines before the war, and he was an expert navigator.
He was impressed with Fertig's civil government, guerrilla
organization, and Filipino morale.

Parsons also informed

Fertig that more supplies would arrive.
Beginning in February 1943, General MacArthur*s
headquarters exercised its authority over Fertig through the
Allied Intelligence Bureau under Colonel Allison Ind, U.S.
Army.

The Allied Intelligence Bureau gathered information
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on the Japanese for Major General Charles Willoughby, U.S.
Army, MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence.

Ind maintained

contact with the coastwatchers on New Guinea, New Britain
and the Solomon Islands who reported Japanese sea and air
movements to U.S. forces.

The Allied Intelligence Bureau

also sent small parties of agents into the Philippines to
gather intelligence on the Japanese garrisons from embryonic
guerrilla groups on each island, including Mindanao.
Because Fertig's intelligence on Japanese activities would
allow MacArthur to make a more successful invasion of
Mindanao, Ind considered the Mindanao guerrillas valuable.
If SWPA HQ were to supply and train the Mindanao guerrillas
to become partisans, it would have a clearer picture of
Japanese plans and dispositions.1
Despite SWPA HQ's location 700 miles away, it had an
easy time bringing Fertig under its authority.

When Fertig

placed himself under MacArthur, Fertig achieved a crucial
step towards commanding a partisan force.

The first

submarine shipment of supplies to Fertig included the latest
radio equipment to make communications with Australia more
reliable (and also make transmitters more vulnerable to
enemy radio detectors).

The most immediate benefits from

coming under MacArthur's command were the supply of arms and
medicine.

The guerrillas needed more supplies to become

1Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 70-71; Allison Ind,
Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War
Acrainst Japan (New York: Van Rees, 1958), vii-viii, 48-57;
James, Years of MacArthur. 2:319, 507.
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strong enough to defend themselves against future Japanese
offensives while MacArthur*s men fought to return to the
Philippines.

In addition, Fertig knew that his guerrillas

lacked the firepower and training to defeat the enemy
garrisons without U.S. support.

The defeats of the

guerrillas at Malaybalay and Butuan illustrated these
weaknesses.2
SWPA HQ ordered the Mindanao guerrillas to assist U.S.
operations with an intelligence reporting system and not to
attempt large-scale military operations (like Butuan and
Malaybalay), which could trigger a strong Japanese
counteroffensive out of reach of SWPA HQ direct assistance.
MacArthur ordered the guerrillas only to fight to defend
themselves.

MacArthur planned to send instructions, radio

equipment, rifles, sub-machine guns, ammunition, and
medicine to give the guerrillas the necessary equipment to
survive Japanese attacks and transmit information.3
Fertig had to unify his command before MacArthur's
orders for him to set up an intelligence net could be
implemented.

If Fertig was to insure that coastwachers and

radio operators were to be properly selected, monitored, and
positioned, he had to establish a firm chain of command from
himself down to the individual guerrillas.

Furthermore,

2Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Fertig to Whitney, 24 January 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA.
3Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Bowler letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 526-28;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 173-201.
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Fertig needed a supply network throughout the island if he
was going to transport the radios, weapons, ammunition, and
spare parts from the submarines.

Fertig needed a unified

command to insure that this equipment would be distributed
properly and not stolen.
Due to a combination of reasons, Fertig had a
relatively easy time establishing his authority over the
American guerrilla leaders.

Hedges, Bowler, and McClish

came from a military culture that trained its men to respect
the Jominian principle of unity of command.

They believed

that one man had to be in charge of tying an island's
resistance forces together, or a chaos of conflicting
directives would have resulted in the midst of a constant
Japanese threat.

Given their belief in unity of command, it

is plausible to assume that MacArthur's appointment of
Fertig to command the island solidified Bowler's, McClish's
and Hedges's respect for Fertig.

Because Fertig was a

Lieutenant Colonel and, therefore, their superior in rank,
Majors Bowler and McClish were also legally obligated as
U.S. Army officers to place their guerrillas under him.
Fertig's goal of establishing a unified resistance also
impressed McClish on a personal level.4
The radios, guns, and propaganda material from
4Bowler letter; Merchant letter; Grashio letter; Blow
letter; Jonassen letter; Samples letter; Childress letter;
Fertig to Whitney, 17 January 1944, RG 16, Box l, MA;
Parsons to G-2, 10 August 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA; Haggerty,
Guerrilla Padre. 244-45.
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MacArthur's headquarters were also beneficial to Fertig's
ability to establish his authority over guerrilla groups.
Rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition gave the guerrillas
more firepower for shorter and deadlier ambushes.

Because

the matchboxes with MacArthur's picture and American
magazines reminded Filipinos and Moros that America was not
defeated but actually winning the war against Japan,
guerrilla morale improved.

One American leaflet contained

pictures of U.S. planes and ships along with the promise in
Tagalog and English that America's vast resources would free
the Philippines.

News of the U.S. victories at Midway,

Guadalcanal, and Tarawa convinced many Filipinos and Moros
that American forces would return to Mindanao.

Therefore,

many Moros and Filipinos considered Fertig a valuable asset
to help them fight the Japanese.5 Such outside aid was
proof to many Filipinos and Moros that the U.S. was still in
the war and could return to Mindanao.

Therefore, they

considered an alliance with U.S. officers on Mindanao
realistic.6
Lauretta, the guerrilla leader of Davao Province,
joined Fertig's command in early 1943 soon after hearing
about it.

McClish sent Lauretta a telegram sometime before

sBowler letter; MacArthur to Fertig, 15 August 1943,
RG 16, Box 29, MA; Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box
11, MA; "America Keeps Her Promises," pamphlet, n.p., circa
1942 or 1943, author's collection.
6Grashio letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
120-126; Keats, They Fought Alone. 193-97.
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April 1943 which stated his strength and that he would like
to stay in regular contact with Lauretta.

Since Lauretta

thought his guerrillas would have greater security if they
had such a powerful ally, he was excited about finding
another guerrilla force to work with.

Lauretta was

pro-American and he proved so when he helped ten prisoners
escape from Davao Prison Camp in April 1943.
not adverse to working with or for Americans.

He also was
In July 1943

Lauretta traveled to McClish's headquarters at Butuan, and
he learned more about Fertig.

Lauretta was in favor of an

overall commander and he agreed to accept Fertig's order
that his men be placed under McClish's command.7
The first serious challenge to Fertig's authority came
from Salipada Pendatun, a successful guerrilla leader in
Cotabato Province, who did not want Fertig to control him.
Because Pendatun did not know Fertig personally or
professionally, it was not clear to him what Fertig could
accomplish; so, Pendatun refused to accept Fertig's
authority over him.

Furthermore, Pendatun was unsure of

Fertig s motives and was afraid that Fertig would try to
take away all of his power and influence in Cotabato.8
The existence of a large and independent regiment such
as Pendatun's conflicted with unified resistance until
7Grashio letter; Mellnick, Philippine Diary. 244-45;
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 99-100; Grashio and
Norling, Return t.o Freedom. 115-30.
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 536; Keats, They
Fought Alone. 173-90.
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Fertig could bring Pendatun's 2,000 men under control.
Fertig had to get this force to cooperate or face the
possibility that Mindanao would have two leaders who would
not work together.

Two such power centers could have

complicated guerrilla operations with violent disputes over
areas of operation.

If Fertig appeared too weak to control

Pendatun, Fertig realized that Moros and Catholic Filipinos
might lose confidence in Fertig's leadership and they might
desert him.

Fertig sent Pendatun messages that stated that

he was the commander of all resistance on the island.
Fertig sent Parsons and Bowler to Cotabato Province to
convince Pendatun to join his command.

Parsons had been on

Mindanao for about two months as MacArthur's supply
coordinator and inspector.

Parsons had a likeable

personality; so, Fertig was confident that Parsons could
tactfully bring Pendatun under control.

The May 1943

discussion between Pendatun and Parsons is not documented.
Because Bowler befriended Pendatun before the war and Bowler
was a valuable resource of information on Pendatun, Fertig
chose Bowler to accompany Parsons.9

Bowler also

demonstrated his skill in organizing resistance in Northern
Bukidnon and it was clear to Fertig that Bowler knew how to
W i t n e y to Chambers, 16 June, 1944, RG 16, Bex 16,
MA; Robert Bowler, Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.), telephone
conversation, 21 June 1990; Willoughby, Guerrilla
Resistance. 93-97; Villamor, They Never Surrendered. 142-47;
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 81-87.
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influence the local population tactfully.10
Major Bowler played an important role in convincing
Pendatun to recognize Fertig's authority.

They were prewar

friends, and this made communication easier between them.
As a Moro, Pendatun placed greater importance on personal
loyalty to Bowler than to Fertig, a stranger.

Pendatun1s

attitude made it easier for Bowler to convince him that
unity of command under Fertig would allow Pendatun's
guerrillas to kill more Japanese and better protect his
people.11
Due to a violent disagreement between Police Major
Angeles Limena and Philippine Army Major Manuel Jaldon in
Misamis Oriental Province early in 1943, Fertig faced a
second and more serious obstacle to the unification of the
resistance.

Limena was so violently-tempered that in

November 1942 he tried to execute a priest whom he had
mistakenly considered a traitor.12 Jaldon had brothers who
were pro-Japanese.

Limena probably feared that Jaldon's

brothers would influence him to collaborate with the
Japanese; so, he attacked Jaldon's headquarters on 17
February 1943.

This created a condition for a potential

10Grashio letter; Pendatun to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG
16, Box 13, MA.
11Pendatun to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG 16, Box 13, MA;
Bowler letter; Bowler telephone conversation.
12Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60
civil war between each nan's unknown number of
supporters.13 If Fertig arrested one or both, he could
have faced an attack against his own headquarters from
embittered followers of both leaders and their families.
Fertig had to solve this problem quickly before an internal
war broke out which the Japanese could exploit by secretly
giving both factions arms to destroy each other.
Fertig restored peace when he transferred both men in
April 1943.

Since Limena was an officer in Bowler's

battalion before the war and the two of them were good
friends, Fertig sent Bowler to calm Limena down.

Bowler

gave Limena some supplies from the first submarine delivery.
Limena's attacks against Jaldon ended within two weeks. To
prevent future battles between their followers, Fertig then
transferred each man to different provinces.

Both received

the same treatment, presumably to offend neither.

With

Jaldon and Limena both gone, there was no more fighting
between their men.

Fertig gave Jaldon another command in

the Zamboanga Province.

It is not clear whether Jaldon's

pro-Japanese brothers influenced him or if he was angry at
being transferred but he deserted to the Japanese sometime
about July 1943.

This incident threw his regiment into

disarray until December 1943 when new leadership arrived.
Limena served under Hedges in Lanao without any apparent
13Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 87-97.
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problems.14
The third and greatest challenge to Fertig's authority
was Morgan, Fertig's Chief of Staff.

Morgan believed he was

betrayed by Fertig when in June 1943 Fertig chose Bowler to
be Fertig's second in command.15 Because Morgan provided
Fertig with his first guerrillas and territory, Morgan
thought he was the more deserving officer.

Morgan did not

have any respect for Fertig, and he planned to control the
resistance secretly.

Consequently, he refused to accept

Fertig's judgment in making another man his second in
command.

Morgan also resented what he saw as Fertig's

racism toward the Filipinos.

He stated that Fertig issued

better equipment to American enlisted men than were issued
to Filipino officers.

Morgan also accused Fertig of only

promoting Americans and placing them in key positions.16
Since the U.S. officers were part of the same military
culture, they were easier for Fertig to control.

Because

the army that the guerrillas would support was American,
American officers were the best men to make the indigenous
14Bowler letter; Royce Wendover, "War Diary 7 December
1941 to 5 December 5 1945," 225-51, WP, CBy Worchester to
Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 43, UM; Willoughby,
Guerrilla Resistance. 87-52; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre.
93-94.
15Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Pendatun
to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG 16, Box 31, MA; Iliff
Richardson, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy (ret.), letter to author,
7 November 1989.
16Fertig to MacArthur, 28 September 1943, RG 16, Box
12, MA; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare. 118-21.
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partisans conform to U.S. missions.

Fertig appointed

Americans who were deeply involved in a certain province's
resistance effort.
Morgan tried to incite the Filipinos and Moros against
Fertig, and he became a serious threat to the unity Fertig
had developed.
to Fertig.

Morgan sent a series of demands and threats

He provided copies to his loyal 80 supporters

and neutral Moro leaders to try to prove his power.

He

promoted himself to "Commander of the Resistance on
Mindanao, the Dutch East Indies, and the British East
Indies."17
Fertig realized that if he executed or imprisoned
Morgan, either action would have radicalized Morgan's 80 men
and other sympathizers.

If Fertig did not exercise

restraint in dealing with Morgan, Morgan's guerrillas would
have become potential enemies.

Because Morgan's men knew

where to find and kill Fertig and other key leaders, they
could be more dangerous than the Japanese soldiers.

Should

Morgan launch any attacks against him, Fertig planned to
lure the Japanese into an attack on Morgan on the Lanao
Province coast while Captain Hedges' Moros were to attack
from inland.
17Morgan to the Dutch and British East Indies, 4 July
1943, RG 16, Box 12, MA; Hailbrunn, Partisan Warfare.
118-21; Keats, They Fought Alone. 329. The author found no
documentation that mentioned any other indigenous leaders
who leveled the charge of racism against Fertig. Fertig's
diary, which is owned by his daughter in Golden, Colorado,
was unavailable to the author. Without an examination of
this diary, any discussion of his "racism" is speculative.
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Since Morgan's attempts to broaden his support failed,
Fertig's patience was justified.

Fertig*s power was

relatively secure after Pendatun joined him in May 1943.
Because the Datus knew that Fertig, not Morgan, had the guns
and authority from MacArthur, Morgan failed to gain Moro
support.

These Moro leaders saw Fertig as the best way to

get more guns to kill Japanese, who were the immediate
threat.

Additionally, one Datu whom Morgan tried to enlist

claimed that Morgan had murdered some of his relatives
during Mindanao's fall in 1942.

This Datu along with others

believed that Morgan still hated

Moros and that he merely

wanted to use them to crush Fertig.

When MacArthur awarded

Fertig a Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest
U.S. medal, in August 1943, Fertig's prestige rose.
Moro's perspective, Fertig then had a more
American weapons which the Koros

From a

assured access to

needed to protect their

people from the enemy.18
Because Fertig wanted to avoid violence with Morgan,
Fertig wanted to put him on the next supply submarine from
Australia.

He asked Morgan to leave for Australia so that

he could train Filipinos for their return to Mindanao.
First Lieutenant Samuel Grashio, United States Army Air
Forces, an escaped prisoner-of-war, established a good
relationship with Morgan and reinforced Fertig's proposal by
18Morgan to Fertig, 4 August 1943, RG 16, Box 12, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 10 August 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 55.
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persuading Morgan that he had to tell his own story at
MacArthur's headquarters if he were to receive any credit
for what he did on Mindanao to oppose the Japanese.

Morgan

probably knew by this point that his attempt to usurp
Fertig's authority was a failure, but this advice gave him
an honorable way to accept defeat, and he left by submarine.
Morgan was obviously a broken man when he left Mindanao.
attended a combat course at the Fraser Commando School.

He
His

activities after that are unknown.19
Small guerrilla bands that formed in southern
Zamboanga after the May 1942 surrender remained independent
of Fertig's command until December 1943.

The separate

guerrilla groups which formed in 1942 to protect Filipino
refugees from enemy troops did not cooperate with the
commanders the former Philippine Army Lieutenant Colonel
Hipolito Garma, the Zamboanga Province Commander, sent from
the province headquarters in Northeastern Zamboanga.

Garma

did not adequately supervise bad commanders like Jaldon.
Therefore, Garma was unable to unify these smaller guerrilla
units.

First Lieutenant Donald LeCouver, U.S. Army Air

Forces, assumed command of the guerrillas in Southern
Zamboanga in December 1943 and finally unified the separate
groups.

He brought his battalion-sized command under

19Grashio letter; Fertig to MacArthur, September 1943,
RG 16, Box 17, MA; "Fraser Commando School Passing Out
Report, L.P. Morgan," 16 April 1944, RG 16, Box 12, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 256-94, 285-300; Grashio and
Norling, Return to Freedom. 133-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
Fertig's control.20
By demanding reports made by courier or radio on unit
strength and activities, Fertig maintained control over the
six province commanders.

With the serious organizational

obstacles removed, Fertig established his command structure
that covered most of Mindanao by September 1943.

Hedges

commanded Lanao Province, McClish led Surigao, Agusan and
Davao Provinces, McGee led Cotabato Province, Garma
commanded the northeastern Zamboanga Province and Misamis
Occidental Province, and Bowler was in charge of Bukidnon.
Fertig made these commanders send reports not only for
information, but also to remind his subordinates that he was
their commander.

It would have been impossible for Fertig

to travel throughout the island to personally supervise his
commanders when travel between adjacent provinces lasted
weeks and fulfill his missions as the overall commander.
Fertig used the reports as a substitute for personal travel
and to evaluate the performance of his commanders.

He also

sent orders to correct problems he saw in the reports.
Because this method of control was very common in the army
Fertig and his commanders were trained in, it was generally
accepted.21
20Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 87-88; McGee, Rice
and Salt. 166-75. McGee has the only information on
LeCouver's early days as a guerrilla leader but he does not
explain how LeCouver unified his command.
21Spielman, "114th Infantry Regiment," 23; Jonassen
letter.
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The local civil government was a key factor in
establishing Fertig's authority over the island and in
achieving unity of command.

Due to the fact that the

resistance civil government kept many Filipinos and Moros as
satisfied as they could have been under the circumstances,
Fertig's province commanders found it easier to implement
military directives.

It was better for Fertig's

headquarters to disseminate anti-Japanese propaganda through
civilian leaders who insured wider distribution.22
The unity Fertig established transformed the Mindanao
guerrillas into partisans.

If the partisans were to

construct a proper intelligence net, SWPA HQ needed one
commander on Mindanao.

Since the most powerful guerrilla

leaders shared his goal of a unified resistance, Fertig
achieved this unity.

By using good negotiators, he overcame

two serious challenges to his authority.

By allowing a

rebel to realize his own weakness and leave the island,
Fertig prevented a civil war within the resistance.
22Jonassen letter; Grashio letter; Willoughby,
Guerrilla Resistance. 333-67; Spielman, "114th Infantry
Regiment," 62.
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CHAPTER 4
PARRYING JAPANESE ATTACKS

Throughout 1943 and 1944, Fertig and his province
commanders faced the danger of Japanese offensives.

The

partisans were not equipped to defeat the Japanese by
destroying them; so, the partisans had to develop a strategy
that would preserve their own strength.

If Fertig and his

officers did not, the Japanese had the firepower to destroy
partisan radio stations and units.

Such a result would have

forced Fertig or his successor to waste time rebuilding the
resistance organization.
Fertig's communications with SWPA HQ concerning
partisan missions and submarine rendezvous also made the
resistance a target for Japanese offensives.

The Japanese

pinpointed his headquarters with radio direction finders.
Since the guerrillas coordinated rendezvous points by radio
for submarine supply shipments of guns, ammunition, and
radios, the Japanese had good reasons to want to destroy the
partisan radios.

Mindanao was the closest Philippine Island

to MacArthur's northwesterly path from New Guinea and the
Japanese feared that MacArthur would try to seize Mindanao
and use its large port at Davao and the airfields at Del
Monte as staging areas for reconquering the rest of the
Philippines.

The eneay must have realized that U.S.
67
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supplies also increased the chances of the partisans
becoming a combat as well as a security threat which would
assist a U.S. invasion force with information on Japanese
garrisons and harass Japanese movements.

Therefore, the

Japanese assembled a 3,000 man force to strike Misamis
Occidental Province, where Fertig's headquarters was, in
June 1943 and attempt to eliminate the partisan radio
traffic with SWPA HQ.1
Fertig realized that his men were not trained or
equipped to defend territory against a Japanese offensive,
and he employed a defensive theory to prevent the enemy from
surrounding and destroying his command.

The resistance

established mutually supporting ambush positions to pin down
any Japanese unit smaller than a battalion while other
partisan ambushers launched flanking or rear attacks on it
to inflict maximum casualties.

He ordered that the

partisans not engage any enemy units of battalion size or
larger.

Fertig anticipated that the rapid partisan

withdrawals along jungle paths which only Filipinos knew
would frustrate Japanese efforts to engage and destroy them.
Fertig expected that Japanese terrorism in the lost areas
would preserve peasant support for the partisans.

He

thought that the enemy's frustration over failing to destroy
the resistance would force the Japanese to halt their
1Grashio letter; Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine
Operations Record, Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944,"
CMH; Keats, They Fought Alone. 227-94.
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offensive and withdraw their troops.

After the Japanese

retreated, the partisans would return and reestablish the
civil government in former Japanese-held areas.2
The flaw in Fertig’s defense plan was the location of
his headquarters in a province, Misamis Occidental, that was
easy for the enemy to isolate from the bulk of his forces.
The Japanese had to control only a seven-mile wide isthmus
between the Pagadian and Panguil Bays and the surrounding
coastal waters to cut Fertig off from the bulk of Mindanao.
Even after several Japanese reconnaissance flights flew over
Fertig's headquarters at Misamis City, he did not move his
command post.

His headquarters was too close to the coast,

and it was vulnerable to a Japanese amphibious commando
raid.

He could have moved to the much safer eastern part of

Mindanao where his escape into the mountainous jungle was
easier, but he did not.3
The Japanese began their first major offensive on
26 June 1943 and they landed simultaneously at Clarin in
Misamis Occidental province just north of Misamis City and
at Tucuran on the other side of the isthmus in the adjacent
2Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Fertig to Commanding General SWPA Forces, 6 March 1943, RG
16, Box 1, MA; Keats, They Fought Alone. 170; Mao, On
Guerrilla War. 46.
3Station WYZB to MacArthur, 27 June 1943, RG 16, Box
29, MA; Worchester to Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42,
UM.
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Zamboanga Province.4 According to Fertig's estimates and a
Japanese wartime document, 3,000 Japanese troops attacked in
a pincer movement to prevent Fertig's escape into Eastern
Mindanao and to destroy his organization.
and one destroyer supported the landings.5

Eight aircraft
The well-armed

Japanese faced only several hundred armed partisans near the
Japanese landing areas.6 Because the partisans lacked
coastal artillery and antiaircraft guns to fight back
effectively, the ship and planes panicked many guerrillas.
Filipinos were not armed or trained to hold their ground
against such heavy firepower; so, most of them deserted
their positions.

If the partisans had not done this, the

Japanese would have surrounded and annihilated the Misamis
Occidental Province resistance.
Fertig tried to control this unexpected partisan mass
escape, but he found it impossible.
Fertig reports which confused him.

Panicked partisans gave
Because the general

panic halted radio communications, Fertig was rarely
informed of the situation.

Fertig loaded his truck with

supplies and tried to reassemble the command, but he could
not contact his commanders.

He kept his SWPA codes and

Dorchester to Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42,
UM; Keats, They Fought Alone. 223.
sFertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record,
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH; Wolfert,
American Guerrilla. 104-15.
6"Local News," RG 16, Box 12, MA; Worchester to
Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42, UM.
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partisan files in a suitcase and fled into the jungle.
Fertig dodged Japanese patrols in Misamis Occidental for a
week.

Finally, Captain Hedges and a Moro company rescued

him, and they took him to Lanao by boat.7
The Japanese incorrectly assumed that the resistance
was destroyed and that all that needed to be done was to
hunt down individual partisans or small partisan bands; so,
they split their 3,000-man force into smaller units.

Their

goal was to find and kill as many partisans as possible and
eliminate the leadership.

The smaller patrols allowed the

Japanese commanders to search larger areas of Misamis
Occidental province in less time, but they lacked the
strength to defend themselves or to assist each other.

The

enemy sweep against the resistance forces was like hundreds
of weak fingers searching through a hornet's nest.

This

weakness allowed first pairs and then hundreds of Filipinos
to reassemble and eliminate some weak and isolated Japanese
patrols.8
The enemy over-reacted to this partisan resurgence by
forming much larger-sized patrols in an attempt to defeat
the partisan platoons or companies.

These enemy patrols

grew in size to battalions which made a lot of noise while
they struggled through the jungle.

The Japanese needed more

7"Kuder Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Keats, They Fought
Alone. 229-44; Wolfert, American Guerrilla. 108-9.
8Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 258-69; Wolfert, American
Guerrilla. 108.
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nobility and information to catch the Filipinos who knew the
local trails well.

Because of their heavy equipment and

their reliance on maps, the Japanese patrols moved slowly
through the jungle.

The enemy controlled an area only as

long as they were actually in it.

The resistance reoccupied

the same area after the Japanese left it.9
By October 1943, the enemy withdrew to the coastal
villages of Misamis Occidental Province.

Their extreme

shifts from small to large patrols without good information
on partisan locations made it almost impossible for them to
eliminate Fertig's forces.

These operations were a drain on

enemy manpower given the fact that the Japanese were
fighting KacArthur in New Guinea and Admiral Chester Nimitz,
U.S. Navy, in the Central Pacific.

Some Japanese left

Misamis Occidental Province and went to other combat zones
in the Pacific.

These withdrawals left Japanese units in

the interior too weak to control their areas; so, the
Japanese retreated to and fortified Misamis City.

According

to Fertig's 9 August 1943 estimates of Japanese casualties,
they suffered 152 dead and 52 wounded from partisan ambushes
since the offensive started in June 1943.10
The partisans retained popular support despite the
fact that the Japanese temporarily pushed them out of the
9Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 250-58.
10Station WYZB to Fertig, 7 August 1943; Fertig to
MacArthur, 9 August 1943; Fertig to MacArthur, 9 August
1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA.
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province.

The Japanese did not destroy the partisan

infrastructure among the townspeople and villagers, and the
resistance easily reestablished its authority over the
indigenous population by reinserting its leaders into the
villages where they spread American propaganda.

Japanese

troops did not remain deep inside the province long enough
to even attempt to gain popular support.

Because the

partisans depended on peasants for food, shelter, recruits,
and information, their relationship with the peasants was
essential for partisan survival.11
SWPA HQ needed a special staff to help the partisans
survive future Japanese offensives and assist the partisans
in developing their intelligence system.

SWPA HQ therefore

in July 1943 established the Philippine Regional Subsection
in MacArthur's headquarters under Colonel Courtney Whitney,
U.S. Army.

He took the responsibility for directing

Fertig's combat and intelligence missions from Colonel Ind's
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

Whitney was responsible for

recognizing the authority of resistance leaders who were
pro-American as well as supplying them with guns to defend
themselves and radios to report enemy information.

The

Philippine Regional Subsection gathered information on
Japanese strength and activities from resistance groups all
over the archipelago, including Mindanao.

Whitney reported

11Station WYZB to Fertig, 9 August 1943, RG 16, Box
29, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 7 August 1943, RG 16, Box 29,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 250-58.
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the intelligence to Lieutenant General Willoughby,
MacArthur's chief intelligence officer.

The Philippine

Regional Subsection had access to Japanese documents that
were translated by Ind's staff.

Colonel Sydney Mashbir,

U.S. Army, and his Allied Translator and Interpreter Service
also gave Whitney translated Japanese documents.

These

documents gave Whitney a good view of Japanese strength and
its colonial administration.

The advantage of dedicating

such a group to the Philippines was that Whitney's staff
became specialists on this prospective battleground and
would be better able to instruct the partisans on their
intelligence missions.12
Whitney's primary concern was that Fertig's partisans
survive Japanese offensives in order to build an
intelligence network.

In December 1943, Whitney was

concerned that Fertig had planned a static defense of his
new headquarters at Esperanza City in Northern Agusan
Province.

Whitney was afraid that increased submarine

supply shipments of cannons and heavy machine guns, would
convince Fertig that he had enough firepower to hold his
ground against a Japanese offensive and thus run the risk of
being destroyed.

Whitney telegrammed Fertig that a mobile

and dispersed defense would probably convince the Japanese
that the partisans were a small threat, and the Japanese
12Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 119-80; James,
Years of MacArthur. 2:506-11.
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would not attack the partisans.13 Whitney supplemented his
message by an order to Fertig not to distribute heavy
weapons to the partisans until an actual U.S. landing on
Mindanao.

SWPA Headquarters feared that such weapons would

force the enemy into wiping out the resistance before a U.S.
landing and would increase Japanese abuse of the
population.14
The radio transmissions threatened the partisans'
existence for about a year before MacArthur's troops
returned to Mindanao; so, Fertig issued the heavy weapons to
his men and established a subcommand to take over the
resistance if he were killed.

Fertig issued the machine

guns and he limited his attacks to ambushes in an effort to
convince the Japanese that his partisans were not a combat
threat to their garrisons.

The partisans were in jeopardy

while they reported intelligence; so, they needed the
machine guns and cannons to increase their firepower to gain
time to relocate their communications equipment in case of
an enemy attack.15 In January 1944 Fertig set up a
sub-command in Western Mindanao called "A Corps" under
Bowler to allow the resistance to continue on its missions
if Fertig's headquarters was destroyed.

Fertig gave him

13Whitney to Fertig, 3 November 1943, RG 16, Box 17,
MA.
14Keats, They Fought Alone. 331-32.
document in his book.

Keats prints this

15Fertig to Whitney, 17 January 1944, RG 16, Box 1,
MA; Keats, They Foucrht Alone. 334-38.
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command of the forces in Zamboanga, Misamis Occidental,
Misamis Oriental, Lanao, Bukidnon, and Cotabato so that
these partisans would have an overall commander close by to
coordinate submarine rendezvous, supply distribution and
partisan missions.16
After having failed to destroy Fertig's force in
Misamis Occidental Province in 1943, the Japanese remained
very concerned about Fertig's radio transmissions to
Australia.

Due to the many radio transmissions that passed

from all provinces to Fertig as well as Fertig's messages to
Australia, the Japanese once again located Fertig's
headquarters with radio direction finders.

The Japanese

were also aware of some of the submarine shipments to the
partisans.

Unless the Japanese were to smash the resistance

soon, the partisan radio reports would give away the
Japanese defense plans that would help MacArthur's planners
send enough troops to crush them.17
The 1944 Japanese offensive's main effort was
concentrated on Fertig's command post in Esperanza City in
the Agusan Province.

According to Fertig's estimates, the

16Bowler letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
535-36.
17Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Document
No. 601006; Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
Document No. 600615, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied Translator
and Interpreter Section Document No. 600420; Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section Document, "Guerrilla
Warfare in the Philippines," RG 3, Box 145, MA. The author
could not find any sources that describe the schedule and
the specific content of each submarine shipment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

77
Japanese seized the mouth of the Agusan River in March 1944
with a 200-man landing force drawn from Misamis Oriental
Province.

They supplemented this attack by landing what

Fertig estimated to be 1,500 troops at Lianga in Surigao
Province.

The enemy intended to smash the partisans with

these simultaneous attacks and encircle as many of the
resistance forces as possible.18 The Japanese forces that
drove southward along the Agusan River were reinforced to
1.000 men and those in Surigao were eventually increased to
3.000 men in June 1944; so, they drove Fertig's 5,403 men
southward along the Agusan River.19
Skillful partisan defenses gave most of Fertig's force
time to evacuate; so, the Japanese pincer attacks never
surrounded the partisans.

For example, one partisan unit

used some 37-millimeter cannons to stall the Japanese
advance.

These partisans were fortunate enough to have

canister rounds which each sprayed 122 steel balls fired
from concealed positions.

Some partisans ambushed Japanese

deep inside their own lines.

For example, one patrol killed

53 enemy who had assembled for a briefing.

McClish, the

commander of the guerrilla forces in Agusan and Surigao
"Philippine Regional Subsection to Chief of Staff
SWPA, 21 March 1944, RG 16, Box 13, MA; Jonassen letter.
19Fertig to MacArthur, 20 June 1944, RG 16, Box 31,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 26 June 1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA;
Whitney to Chief of Staff SWPA, 6 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 7 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA;
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 539. The author could not
find any Japanese estimates for their troop strength in this
offensive against Fertig's headquarters.
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Provinces, proved to be a good tactician who insured that
his men retreated before they were overwhelmed.

Such

performance and dedication bought Fertig enough time to move
his headquarters several times during the Japanese offensive
without losing communications with SWPA HQ in Australia.

No

partisan casualty figures were available for this sector of
the Japanese offensive.20
The intelligence network of Lieutenant Colonel Clyde
Childress, U.S. Army, played a vital role in helping to
relieve pressure on the Agusan and Surigao resistance
forces.

SWPA HQ gave Fertig the authority to promote

Childress from Major to Lieutenant Colonel.

His

organization gave Fertig detailed information on enemy
activities near the Davao Naval Base where more than 20,000
Japanese troops concentrated on fortifying the Davao port
against a U.S. landing.

This information allowed McClish to

concentrate most of his men to oppose attacks from Northern
Agusan and Surigao without using manpower unnecessarily to
prepare defense against attacks from Davao.

Most

importantly, Childress's spies sent SWPA HQ by submarine
photographs of Davao with ships, buildings, and air defense
installations plotted on them, which made the August and
September 1944 Army Air Forces and Navy air attacks
20Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 9 July 1944, RG 16,
Box 58, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 12 July 1944, RG 16, Box
58, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 16 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58,
MA; Jonassen letter; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 18
July 1944, RG 16, BOX 58, MA.
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effective.

For example, on one raid, B-24 bombers from a

New Guinea airbases destroyed 34 planes before they were
airborne and killed 100 Japanese.

Because the U.S. attacks

were so destructive, the Japanese became convinced that U.S.
landings were imminent.

They halted their major

antipartisan sweeps and in September 1944 began to prepare
for the expected U.S. landings.21
The Japanese battalion offensives in April and May
1944 in Bowler's provinces also failed to eradicate the
resistance.

These attacks were uncoordinated.

By laying

ambushes that bought enough time for their escape, Bowler's
men learned to evade these attacks without suffering many
casualties.

The partisan ambushers also struck the enemy

when they returned to their bases.

The resistance was so

good at preserving its strength that the Japanese only
killed 260 partisans in the A Corps area.22
Despite the large Japanese patrols, Bowler's men
21Chiiaress letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 28 July 1944,
RG 16, Box 58, MA; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 5 August
1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA; Davao Gulf Evacuee Report, RG 16,
Box 44, MA; Whitney, Guerrilla Resistance. 543; M. Hamlin
Cannon, Levte: The Return to the Philippines. 2d ed., U.S.
Army in World War Two Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1987), 42.
22Samples letter; MacArthur to Fertig, Cushing,
Abcede, and Peralta, 19 October 1944, RG 16, Box 5, MA;
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Document No.
601006, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied Translator and Interpreter
Section Document No. 600615, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section Document No. 60042, RG 3,
Box 145, MA; Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
Report, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," RG 3, Box
145, MA; Spielman, "History of the 114th Regiment," 28.
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launched damaging raids along the Sayre Road.

The partisans

launched ambushes and commando raids on enemy troops and
vehicles on bridges that carried the road.

The partisans

burned some bridges that spanned rivers and gorges; so, the
Japanese were forced to rebuild them.

Partisan ambushers

usually set up their attacks where the road crossed a hill
where Japanese vehicles had to slow down, making the
occupants vulnerable to partisan fire.

If a Japanese convoy

contained more than four vehicles, the average ambush patrol
fled; so, that the partisans would not be overwhelmed.
Lieutenant Colonel James Grinstead, who was promoted by
Fertig and was the Bukidnon Province commander, and his
partisans killed 68 Japanese troops and destroyed 31 trucks
in only 11 ambushes.

Because the Sayre Road was the fastest

route for the Japanese to shift forces to oppose prospective
landing sites at Davao, Cagayan, and Malabang, the road's
security became more important to the Japanese as MacArthur
came closer to the Philippines.

Because of th-e damaging

partisan attacks, the Japanese reinforced their road
garrison to Fertig's estimate of 1,000 men by May 1944.
These men could have attacked partisan areas but instead,
they were on the defensive.23
^Jonassen letter; Merchant letter; Fertig to
MacArthur, 26 March 1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA; Fertig to
MacArthur, 20 October 1943, RG 16, Box 30, MA; Fertig to
MacArthur, 25 November 1343, RG 16, Box 30, MA; Fertig to
MacArthur, 28 November 1943, RG 16, Box 50, MA; Fertig to
MacArthur, 11 May 1944, RG 16, Box 30, MA; "Allied
Translator and Interpreter Service Current Translations," 2
February 1945, RG 3, Box 146, MA. The author could not
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The Japanese never separated the partisan force from
its support base— the people.

Peasants continued to pass

information on enemy activity to the partisans.

This

intelligence allowed the resistance to disperse units before
a massive enemy attack and to reassemble to strike the
Japanese when they returned to their base camps.

Peasants

continued to join the partisans and to replace casualties.
Because Filipinos and Moros regarded the enemy as
unappeasable, further Japanese movements through Bukidncn,
Agusan and Surigao only made the Mindanaoans more determined
to assist the partisans.
The Japanese never formed effective spy groups among
the population to infiltrate the partisans and guide
Japanese patrols to the partisan infrastructure.

Such a

capability would have given the Japanese the means to
capture or assassinate partisan commanders and propartisan
political leaders.

If the Japanese succeeded in killing

enough partisan leaders, this would have disrupted the
partisan intelligence net that the enemy feared so much.
Instead, the Japanese coerced Filipino policemen into these
units.
masters.

These Filipinos were rarely loyal to their Japanese
The infiltration effort of the resistance into

these units was so successful that by October 1944 the
partisans knew not only the strength of former Filipino
policemen on Mindanao (3,000 according to Fertig) but each
locate any Japanese documents that confirmed or denied these
events.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

company commander's name and the location of his
headquarters.

The Japanese Army on Mindanao relied too

heavily on its conventional combat power to defeat the
partisans and therefore it neglected to purge unenthusiastic
police or partisan spies from its units.24
The failure of the Japanese offensives in the spring
and summer of 1944 to destroy the resistance was the turning
point in the battle for Mindanao.

Because the Japanese were

too busy building defenses against potential U.S. landings
at the Davao and Zamboanga Cities, they were too occupied to
launch any more major offensives against the Mindanao
partisans.

The Japanese deployed one division near Davao

City and three battalions near Zamboanga City.

Partisan

units in every province reoccupied their lost areas.

From

September 1944 until the U.S. landings in April 1945, the
resistance was able to concentrate most of its energy on
completing its intelligence network to assist U.S. landings
without being disrupted by major Japanese offensives.25
The partisans fought against the enemy offensives in
1943 and 1944 with a combination of active and passive
strategies.

They gathered information on enemy activities

and prepared their ambushes.

The flexible partisan

24,lReport on the Bureau of Constabulary Organization,
Philippines," 10 October 1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Merchant
letter; Jonassen letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
333-67.
25,lSummary of Enemy Situation," 7 November 1944, RG
16, Box 3, MA; Cannon, Leyte, 52.
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ambush-and-run tactics nullified superior Japanese firepower
and bought tine for escape.

Partisan attacks on the Sayre

Road forced the ener.y to immobilize perhaps 1,000 men to
guard the road.

The Japanese never developed effective spy

networks among the partisans, and Japanese troops were never
able to inflict great harm on the partisans.
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CHAPTER 5
SUPPORTING U.S. OPERATIONS

The Mindanao partisans had to send information on
Japanese sea and land operations and/or develop their combat
strength to assist U.S. landings if they were to have a
significant impact on the Pacific War.

Because the

resistance was so large, it had the potential to report
Japanese activities which would reduce the possible
surprises for U.S. forces in the Pacific and those that
would land on Mindanao.

Because the partisans lacked formal

intelligence and radio training, this was a difficult task.
If the landing forces did not control partisan operations,
it would have been impossible for the partisans and U.S.
forces to apply simultaneous pressure on the Japanese
garrison.

This could have resulted in a needlessly longer

campaign for U.S. forces.
MacArthur was well aware of how valuable coastwatchers
were in the Pacific War and he wanted such men on Mindanao.
Coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands radioed the locations
of enemy troop convoys headed for Guadalcanal; so, the U.S.
Navy was able to intercept and destroy most of them before
they could land reinforcements that could have destroyed the
hard-pressed U.S. Marines.

MacArthur relied on Fertig to

implement an intelligence gathering and reporting system.
84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
Partisan spies living near the Japanese garrisons were in a
prime position to give MacArthur's planners raw data on the
Japanese so that enemy weaknesses could be exploited.1
SWPA HQ gave Fertig the coastwatcher station locations
it desired.

He passed the orders to the province commanders

who placed some of their men at such locations.

The

partisan coastwatcher stations gradually spread to all of
the coasts of Mindanao.

By June 1944, a coastwatcher

station was near the important Basilan and Surigao Straits
as well as in every province.2
SWPA HQ gave the partisan coastwatchers important
instructions for their dangerous mission.

Lieutenant

Colonel Steve Mellnick, U.S. Army, who was on Willoughby's
staff, sent copies of the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" to
the partisans to help them send more specific reports on
enemy attacks and movements.

Four net control stations on

Mindanao that were responsible

for making anyone whoused

the frequency identify himself

for greater

security,passed

the coastwatcher reports to Fertig who then sent them to
SWPA HQ.

Whitney criticized some radio stations for not

reporting in at scheduled times or not following the orders
ionassen letter; Bowler letter; Spector, Eagle
Against the Sun. 166-78, 458-59.
information Report No. 211, 14 April 1943; Fertig to
MacArthur, 18 May 1943, RG 16,
Box 17, MA;
Fertig to
Parsons, 10 September 1943, RG
16, Box 13,
MA; Parsons to
McCallum, 11 January 1944, RG 16, Box 6, MA; Whitney to
Chief of Staff, 21 March 1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; James,
Years of MacArthur. 2:507-11.
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of the various Mindanao partisan and SWPA HQ net control
stations.

Radios were rather complex for men who were not

trained for them so such problems were inevitable.

Their

"on-the-job" training included fighting malaria and avoiding
enemy patrols but they became more skillful operators.

SWPA

HQ code books that allowed the operators to change
frequencies at certain times to confuse enemy radio
direction finders kept most radio stations secure.

Due to

these frequency changes, the Japanese had to search a
frequency spectrum about 1000 kilocycles wide.

This search

required two instruments to pinpoint a suspicious area in
less than five minutes to locate the partisan radio.

If the

partisans followed proper radio procedures and kept their
transmissions under five minutes, they could usually escape
detection.3
The typical coastwatcher led a potentially perilous
life.

He had to keep his radio transmissions to the net

control station short to avoid detection by enemy radio
direction finders in the area.

Due to the fact that he

required a hilltop position to see the most area, the
3"Guerrilla Radio Correspondence Map," January 1945,
RG 23a, Box 12, MA; Gerald Chapman, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.
Air Force, (ret.), letter to author, 7 November 1989;
Samples letter; MacArthur to Fertig, Smith, Abcede, Peralta,
Kangleon, Cushing, Inginiero and Young, 2 August 1944, RG
16, Box 5, MA; William Johnson, M.D., D.D.S., letter to
author, 28 June 1990; Mellnick, Philippine Diarv. 288-89.
SWPA HQ sent Johnson and other coastwatchers pamphlets that
assigned codes to diagrams of different types of Japanese
merchant ships. The coastwatcher radioed that code along
with the location of the vessel to Fertig's station.
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coastwatcher was vulnerable to visual detection by enemy
aircraft and to radio direction finders.

Suitable locations

for sighting Japanese ships in important straits and other
narrow water passages were also predictable targets for
enemy observation.

Because the coastwatcher and his

assistants could not defend themselves against a Japanese
patrol, they had to be ready to destroy their equipment and
quickly escape.

In Surigao Province, partisan ambushes were

so effective at defeating small Japanese patrols that had
the mobility to find coastwatchers, that the Japanese only
sent larger and noisier patrols which gave coastwatchers
enough warning to escape.
The coastwatchers gave the U.S. Navy valuable
information despite the dangers.

These stations sent their

messages to the net control stations, which in turn sent
them to Fertig's headquarters.

Ke radioed the intelligence

to SWPA HQ which passed it to the U.S. Navy.

On 6-7 April

1944, coastwatchers tracked a powerful Japanese naval force
that the partisans believed to be five battleships, one
heavy cruiser, and five destroyers moving westward through
the Basilan Straits just south of Zamboanga City and then
northeastward along the western coast of Mindanao.

A

station on the Agusan Province coast also reported this
force later.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet Intelligence staff

absorbed this data into their records in order to improve
their knowledge of Japanese activities.

In June 1944,

Fertig's coastwatchers also tracked and reported the
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Japanese First Mobile Fleet that moved from Tawi Tavi in the
Sulu Islands and through the Surigao Straits on about 13
June to attack the U.S. Navy's Task Force 58 near the
Mariana Islands.

Because the partisans sent this

information, U.S. Navy commanders had more time to plan and
deploy for their victory in the naval Battle of the
Philippine Sea, 19-21 June 1944.4
«

The Mindanao human intelligence network provided the
Japanese with a plausible explanation for how the U.S.
accquired so much information on Japanese strategy.
MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz utilized extensive
signal intelligence to provide information to U.S. ground,
sea, and air commanders.

However, every time U.S. forces

used this information to win battles, they faced the risk of
alerting the Japanese that their code was broken and forcing
the Japanese to change their codes.

The coastwatcher signal

traffic on Mindanao and throughout the Philippines was known
to the Japanese and gave them a plausible explanation for
how the U.S. knew about Japanese ship movements and
operations.5
4"Philippine Frequency List," RG 16, Box 7, MA;
Chapman letter; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 8 April
1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Mellnick, Philippine Diary. 295-5;
Spielman, "114th Infantry Regiment," 24; Willoughby,
Guerrilla Resistance. 348-50; Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy.
303-10; Spector, Eagle Against the Sun. 458-59.
sAllied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest
Pacific Area Enemy Publications Number 359, RG 3, Box 137,
MA; Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record,
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH; Spector, Eagle
Against the Sun. 445-60.
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The Mindanao resistance also increased the
effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's Third Fleet's devastating
air raids on Mindanao in September 1944.

Thanks to detailed

partisan intelligence on the locations of Japanese
airfields, air defense positions and types of aircraft, U.S.
Naval aircraft knew where to find and destroy Japanese
planes on Mindanao.

Because the information eliminated the

need for aerial reconnaissance that would have alerted the
Japanese, the U.S. pilots achieved complete surprise and
destroyed 60 Japanese planes on the ground and eight in the
air.

This left the island too weak to threaten MacArthur's

invasion armada with land based aircraft attacks; so, he
decided to bypass Mindanao and land at Leyte. There American
forces could cut the Japanese forces in the Philippines in
half and capture an excellent harbor.6
The partisans also supplied useful intelligence
material to SWPA HQ by submarine.

Thanks to the partisan

spies who stole Japanese documents from their garrisons,
Fertig sent Whitney many captured copies of the "Official
Journal of the Japanese Military Administration," the
Japanese "Official Gazette," and newspapers.

Whitney used

this material to study Japanese occupation policy.

Japanese

propaganda leaflets added to his data on their threat to the
^ellnick, Philippine Diary. 295-97, Cannon, Leyte,
42-43.
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popular support of the resistance.7
By December 1944, Fertig's intelligence personnel ran
a communication system which in Whitney's words was "an
example of guerrilla efficiency."

SWPA HQ's guidance and

the resistance's tenacity were responsible for an
intelligence force which had a system of more than 58 radio
stations which included 29 coastwatcher stations.

The

partisans operated a flexible network that was prepared to
operate under emergency net control stations even if their
usual control stations and Fertig's headquarters were
destroyed.

Because several stations were prepared to

perform as net control stations if existing ones were
destroyed or had to relocate due to Japanese pressure, the
radio net was flexible.8
MacArthur wanted to liberate Mindanao for military and
humanitarian reasons.

Because the Zamboanga Province

contained airfields that would help protect the Borneo
operations that would begin in May 1945, he first wanted to
liberate Zamboanga Province in March 1945.

MacArthur

Philippine Regional Subsection to Chief of Staff,
SWPA, 17 August 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Philippine Regional
Subsection to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 19 October 1943, RG 16,
Box 1, MA.
8"General Headquarters, SWPA, Military Intelligence
Section General Staff Radio Locator Map," 24 February 1944,
RG 16, 3ox 2, MA; MacArthur to Fertig, Smith, Abcede,
Peralta, Kangleon, Cushing, Inginiero and Young, 2 August
1944, RG 16, Box 5, MA; "10th Military District United
States Forces in the Philippines Radio Communications Report
No. l," l December 1944, RG 16, Box 7, MA; Whitney to
Fertig, 21 December 1944, RG 16, Box 11, MA.
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thought that he would need Mindanao and the Visayan Islands
to stage the giant invasion of Japan.

Because MacArthur

sent Eichelberger's Eighth Army to liberate the Visayas and
Mindanao instead of reinforcing his hard-pressed Sixth Army
on Luzon, the Luzon campaign lasted longer than it might
have.

The Visaya, Mindanao, and Borneo operations were

deviations from his strategy of bypassing strong Japanese
pockets and maintaining a forward momentum towards Japan.
MacArthur was aware that strategy is not always dictated
solely by military considerations.

MacArthur knew of the

brutal Japanese rule and he was afraid that bypassed
Japanese troops would massacre the indigenous population
along with prisoners-of-war.

Mindanaoans certainly wanted

MacArthur to free them from the constant Japanese menace as
soon as possible regardless of the strategic implications.9
Under the protection of U.S. air supremacy over the
Philippines, Fertig flew to meet with Eichelberger at Leyte
Island several times before the U.S. landings on Mindanao in
March 1945.

The plan was to coordinate the partisan effort

with U.S. combat operations.

Because unauthorized partisan

attacks in areas that U.S. forces had to break through could
draw sufficient Japanese forces to delay or halt the
9Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines. 2d
ed., U.S. Army in World War Two Series (Washington, D.C.:
Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1984),
584-85, 591-97, 620-48; James, Years of MacArthur. 2:738-41,
755; D. Clayton James, "MacArthur1s Lapses From an
Envelopment Strategy in 1945," Parameters: Journal of the
U.S. Army War College 10 (June 1980): 26-32.
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'Americans and upset important operations, the partisans
needed guidance from Eichelberger.

Partisan cooperation

with the U.S. Eighth Army would enable both forces to assist
each other during a crisis.

Unity of command under the army

was vital to applying simultaneous pressure on the enemy.10
Fertig must have left the meetings with a better
understanding of the scheme for liberation.11
Fertig's conferences with Eichelberger and resistance
intelligence reports provided the U.S. Army with valuable
information for the Zamboanga Province landings that would
commence in March 1945.

According to partisan estimates and

Japanese wartime documents, the resistance gave Eichelberger
a fairly accurate estimate of the province's 8,900 Japanese
soldiers and sailors of the 54th Independent Mechanized
Brigade.

Eichelberger's Eighth Army staff created a

partisan subsection to analyze resistance intelligence.
This staff compared this information with their estimates
and drew an accurate picture of Japanese capabilities.
Thanks to this information, Eichelberger knew that the
Japanese planned to fight a few miles north east of
Zamboanga City where they would be less affected by U.S.
10"Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger's Diary," 25
January 1945, Eichelberger Papers [hereafter EP], Box 80,
William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North
Carolina [hereafter DU]; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare.
114-17.
11"Eichelberger's Official Correspondence," 6 March
1945, EP, Box 7, DU? Smith, Triumph. 592-93, Appendix A-l.
Eichelberger's Eighth Army consisted cf the 10th, 11th and
24th Corps.
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naval gunfire.

Therefore, he planned to move inland as fast

as possible to destroy the Japanese.12
Because U.S. units would land near Zamboanga City in
March 1945, Eighth Army headquarters on Leyte needed to talk
to partisans who knew about the landing area.

Captain Royce

Wendover, U.S. Army, was a Zamboanga Province partisan and a
former enlisted sailor who was stationed in Zamboanga City
before the war.
guerrillas.

He fled the Japanese and joined the

He knew much about the geography of where the

U.S. troops would land.
headquarters.

Wendover flew to the Eighth Army

Wendover analyzed photos of the city and his

knowledge of local terrain helped him identify enemy
fortifications for Eichelberger's intelligence staff.

He

also pointed out that due to a non-negotiable eight to
twelve foot sea wall, one of the prospective landing areas
at the city was impractical.

Wendover also identified

nearby gravel beds that would be required for road and
airfield construction or repair. . He showed Eighth Army
planners an estuary that American troops could use to attack
the city from the north if it was heavily defended on the
12Fertig to MacArthur, 13 February 1945, RG 16, Box
33, MA; "Staff Study, Operation Victor Four," 12 February
1945, RG 3, Box 156, MA; "Japanese Plans for the Defense of
Mindanao," EP, Box 96, DU; Smith, Triumph. 592-93. Smith
used a postwar interview the U.S. Army conducted with Major
Jiro Harada of the Japanese Zamboanga garrison and U.S.
estimates to determine the Japanese strength near Zamboanga
City.
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southern coast.13
Eichelberger planned to invade Mindanao in two stages.
First he would land the 41st Division at Zamboanga City on
10 March 1945.

Its main mission was to secure the three

airfields near the city to cover MacArthur's prospective
invasion of Borneo in May 1945.

Then the division was to

secure the rest of the province.

Then from 17 to 22 April,

the 31st and 24th U.S. Divisions of the 10th Corps would
land at Malabang and Parang Cities.

The 24th Division's

objective was to capture Davao City and clear the rest of
the province of enemy troops.

The 31st Division had to

secure the Sayre Road and liberate Northern Mindanao.14
Eichelberger wanted an airfield that would be close
enough to protect his Zamboanga City beachhead; so, in
February 1945 he ordered a U.S. Marine fighter bomber
squadron from Marine Air Group 12 to a partisan-controlled
airfield at Dipolog in northern Zamboanga Province.

A

partisan battalion of 500 men defended this important
airfield.

The Japanese launched several strong attacks, and

they forced the partisans closer to the airfield.

The

partisans and Marine pilots worked together to halt the
enemy incursions at Dipolog.

The partisans provided

security while the planes refueled and the pilots made
13Royce Wendover, "Special Assignment G-3 to 8th
Army," "Foreshadows," WP, CB.
14Smith, Triumph, 591-96, 624; James, Years of
MacArthur 2:755.
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strafing runs on enemy spearheads.

The best example of this

partisan-Marine teamwork occurred on 27 March, 1945 when 150
elite Japanese troops were only 16 kilometers from Dipolog.
The partisan commander, Major Donald Hills, U.S. Army, knew
the enemy locations but he lacked maps and radio to direct
the pilots; so, he rode with one pilot and guided four
planes against the Japanese.

The enemy retreated and the

partisans were spared what would have been a costly
battle.15
Japanese forces on Mindanao were not well-prepared for
the coming battles.

Only 15,000 of the 43,000 troops in the

Japanese 30th and 100th divisions were qualified
infantrymen.

The 30th Division's main defense area was

along the Sayre Road in Bukidnon Province.
its nine battalions in the Leyte battles.
Division was deployed north of Davao City.
well-trained officers.

It lost four of
The 100th
It had only ten

The Japanese 54th Independent

Mechanized Brigade in Zamboanga Province was in poor
condition to resist the U.S. landings.
men.

It had only 8,000

It was isolated from the Japanese 100th and 30th

Divisions in Eastern Mindanao; so, it had no chance of
slowing the U.S. liberation.

Worst of all, the Japanese

Commanding General Gyosaku Morozumi drafted no realistic
15Fertig to MacArthur, 10 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34,
MA; Wade Boggs, Marine Aviation in the Philippines
(Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters U.S.
Marine Corps, 1951), 112-17.
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defense plans.

He expected each of his divisions to guard

its own province, lure U.S. forces into a close quarter
battle in the jungle to cause them as many casualties as
possible, and not expect reinforcement from another
province.

He did not force the two division commanders to

link their defenses in order to prevent isolation and
piecemeal destruction.

This failure was symptomatic of

widespread defeatism among Japanese officers and
sergeants.16 Other Japanese officers shared General
Morozumi's belief that American forces would bypass Mindanao
in 1945, and this led to a less than diligent effort to
present a coordinated defense.17
U.S. Army forces landed two miles north of Zamboanga
City on 10 March 1945 and quickly moved inland.

Because the

Japanese had been softened by a seven-day bombardment by the
U.S. Army Air Forces, the U.S. 41st Division's two infantry
regiments encountered light opposition.

The main American

operations took place deep inside the jungle north of the
city where the enemy fought desperately but hopelessly
against the better-armed Americans.
The Zamboanga partisans gave the 41st Division
valuable support by harassing the Japanese brigade's retreat
to Moroc, north of Zamboanga city.

The partisans set up

16"Interview of Major Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th
Independent Mechanized Brigade," EP, Box 22B, DU; McGee,
Rice and Salt. 9-12, 166-69.
17"Interview with General Gyosaku Morozumi," EP, Box
96, DU.
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strong defenses behind Japanese lines on a series of ridges
around Moroc.

This denied the enemy defense positions badly

needed to slow down the 163rd U.S. Rifle Regiment.

The

partisans used their thorough knowledge of the area to
dominate key ridges with heavy weapons and to ambush enemy
patrols that tried to pass through the valleys. The
partisans even pushed some enemy elements toward the
Americans.

The Japanese could not take time to drive out

the partisans; so, they by-passed Moroc and tried to escape
to the northeastward.18
Local partisans also prevented the enemy 54th
Independent Mechanized Brigade from occupying key defense
terrain at Bolong, north of Moroc on the Zamboanga
Peninsula.

A partisan battalion defended this key area and

killed 51 of the enemy.

If the Japanese had retained

Bolong, they could have fought a guerrilla war from a
mountain stronghold or they could have retreated up the
coast road to Eastern Mindanao.
The road blocks the Zamboanga partisans established
along the western coastal road caused serious problems for
the retreating enemy brigade which tried to use it.

Over

1,200 Japanese failed to pierce the partisan defenses, and
18,,Palawan and Zamboanga Operations,” EP, Box 22B, DU;
"Interview of Major Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th Independent
Mechanized Brigade,” 14 January 1947, EP, Box 22B, DU;
"Interview of Gunner Arkoff," Hargis Westerfield Papers, CB;
William McCartney, The Junqleers: A History of the 41st
Infantry Division (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press,
1948), 143-49; Smith, Triumph. 195-600.
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the relentless U.S. advance pushed the Japanese into very
mountainous and malaria-infested areas.

Because of the

partisan combat support, more than 7,000 out of the 8,000
Japanese that fought the U.S. landings died from battle,
disease, and starvation by the end of the war in September
1945.19
The partisans compounded the Japanese problems in
eastern Mindanao before the U.S. landings at Parang and
Malabang when they made it difficult for the Japanese to
move between garrisons.

Partisan attacks forced enemy

troops that should have been in a mobile reserve or
constructing defenses to guard the enemy-held Sayre Road and
Highway One.

The partisans infested every province.

They

cut telegraph wires, blew up bridges, and ambushed enemy
columns.

Partisan raids destroyed almost all the trucks in

the Japanese 100th Division at Davao City, denying the
Japanese the mobility to quickly restructure their defenses
if they had to.

Partisan raids and Japanese lack of radio

parts cut Japanese communications, which increased Japanese
reaction time to counter potential American landings.20
19Royce Wendover, "War Diary," vol. 2, WP, CB, 561;
"Palawan and Zamboanga Operations;" "Interview of Major
Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th Independent Mechanized
Brigade," 14 January 1947, EP, Box 22B, DU; "Interview of
Gunner Arkoff," Hargis Westerfiel Papers, CB; McCartney,
Junqleers. 143-149; Smith, Triumph. 595-600. The author
found no evidence that proves that fighting lasted beyond
the Japanese surrender.
20"Interview with General Jiro Harada," EP, Box 95,
DU; Fertig to MacArthur, 8 February 1945, RG 16, Box 33, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 February 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA.
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Fertig was aware that the U.S. landings would occur at
Malabang and Parang on 17 April 1945 and ordered that an
assault be planned in support of the landings to annihilate
the Japanese garrison at Malabang.

He entrusted this task

to Hedges's Lanao Province partisans.

Hedges realized the

tremendous strength of a well-armed force in buildings; so,
he assembled nearly 3,000 men and placed them under his best
combat leader, an escaped Australian infantryman, Major Rex
Blow.

These men faced about 300 Japanese.

Blow organized

the force and planned the attack for a month.

If air

support was required, the battle site was well within range
of the Marine fighter bombers at Dipolog.

The partisans

also coordinated air support: through MacArthur's
headquarters.

Such air support and close timing to the

American landings insured that the partisans would be
rescued if they got into serious trouble.21
The partisans began their attack on 12 March 1945, but
Japanese bunkers, trenches, tunnels, and minefields slowed
their advance.

Enemy troops used the tunnels to reinforce

threatened areas inside Malabang.

The partisans did not

have artillery or sufficient heavy machine-guns to pin the
Japanese, and they relied on ground attack missions from the
Marine planes from Dipolog and Army bombers from the 13th
Air Force.

Because the friendly planes did not signal that

21Fertig to MacArthur, 24 February 1945, RG 16, Box
34, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 29 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 15 April 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA;
Samples letter.
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their attacks had been completed, a few partisan attacks
were aborted.

This partisan delay gave dazed Japanese

defenders time to rally, reoccupy their bunkers, and defeat
some ground assaults.

The airfield at Malabang fell on

24 March 1945 and allowed the partisans to be resupplied
there.

Major Blow offset the advantages the Japanese had in

fortifications when he attacked in different places with
small units while the Moros launched intermittent but
frightening attacks from many directions at once.

Blow's

men pushed the Japanese into a fort inside the city and
surrounded them.

Two hundred enemy troops broke through the

partisan ring and escaped.22
Lieutenant Colonel Bowler flew from Mindanao to brief
the 10th Corps commander, Brigadier General Frank Sibert, on
partisan and Japanese dispositions.

Bowler gave Sibert

valuable information on partisan capabilities and Japanese
activity.

Because U.S. possession of Kabacan would divide

enemy forces into two parts, he advised the general to
capture it.

Bowler explained that the Japanese were so

uncertain about U.S. intentions that they constantly shifted
troops north and south along the Sayre Road between the
possible invasion sites at Davao and Cagayan harbors.
Bowler also warned the general of the enemy fortifications
from Digos to Central Cotabato and made it clear to Sibert
that the Japanese planned their main defenses along the
22Bowler letter; Samples letter; Blow letter; Fertig
to MacArthur, 9 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA.
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Sayre Road north of Kabacan and north of Davao City.23
The partisan seizure of Malabang made it easier for
elements of the U.S. 10th Corps to land on 17 April 1945 and
to drive inland quickly.

Partisan reports that Malabang and

Parang were secure allowed Eichelberger to shift most of his
24th Division to Parang where they would be closer to
Highway One.

This enabled two infantry regiments to move

more quickly on Highway One toward the Kabacan junction in
an attempt to split the Japanese 30th Division to the north
from the enemy 100th Division to the south near Davao.
Because the 24th Division moved so rapidly, the Japanese did
not have enough time to delay the Americans along Highway
One.

The Japanese forces at Kabacan were unable to prepare

adequate defenses before the U.S. forces crashed down on
them on 23 April.

With Kabacan lost, the enemy in Davao was

isolated from the Japanese on Sayre Road, and neither enemy
force assisted the other in the upcoming battles.24
The Davao Province partisans assisted the 24th Division
during the battle for the Davao area.

Lauretta's

2,038 men were a few miles north of the Japanese defenses at
Davao.

The U.S. 24th Division pounded the Japanese defenses

from the southeast in May.

The partisans were not armed

^Bowler letter; Smith, Triumph. 620-47.
24Fertig to MacArthur, 12 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur,8 April 1945,RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 10 April 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 12 April 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 13 April 1945; RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Smith, Triumph. 620-30.
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well enough to assault the Japanese; so, they attacked their
outposts and patrols.

Partisans defended small airstrips

for American artillery observation planes.

The partisans

also guarded roads that led northward in order to cut off
any enemy reinforcements from strengthening Davao.

Because

the Japanese sought to escape the devastating U.S.
firepower, they began to move north against Lauretta's men.
The partisans informed the 24th Division of the Japanese
movements.

Lauretta rebuffed some Japanese northward probes

but he was not strong enough to stop their retreat from the
U.S. troops, and some Japanese escaped into the jungle.25
While the Battle for Davao raged, the Bukidnon
partisans assisted U.S. 31st Division operations on the
Sayre Road.
1945.

The division landed near Parang on 22 April

The Americans and Filipinos faced a weak force of

5,800 enemy infantry and 9,500 poorly trained service
troops.

The Filipinos used their stealth to creep up and

observe Japanese activities.

Partisan units showed great

skill in scouting for intelligence and then leaving an area
before they were caught between U.S. and Japanese patrols.
Because the Filipinos knew their trails well, U.S.
commanders attached the partisans to U.S. patrols where they
helped the Americans find the Japanese.

Other partisans

^Fertig to MacArthur, 2 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 4 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Fertig
to MacArthur, 5 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Fertig to
MacArthur, 6 May 1945; RG 16, Box 35, MA; Marshall
telephone conversation; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance.
542-43; Smith, Triumph. 624.
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assisted American engineers in the repair of roads so that
American troops were well-supplied from their lorries on the
Sayre Road.26
When the Filipinos and Americans pushed the Japanese
off of the Sayre Road in May, partisan harassment continued
against the Japanese.

The Filipinos continued to guide U.S.

patrols down the fastest routes to attack the retreating
Japanese.

A U.S. infantry battalion landed at Butuan Bay on

25 June 1945.

The partisans guided it to the last Japanese

defenses at Waloe and helped the Americans scatter the
enemy.

The Filipinos hunted down Japanese survivors until

the war ended on Mindanao in August 1945. 27
The Mindanao partisans gave U.S. forces valuable
support in 1944-1945.

They built an intelligence net that

reported Japanese naval movements to the U.S. Navy, and the
partisans informed MacArthur1s staff of Japanese strength
and activities.

This information allowed the U.S. Navy to

destroy more Japanese ships during the Battle for the
Philippine Sea.

Coastwatcher radio traffic provided the

Japanese with another reason besides codebreaking as to how
26Jonassen letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 5 May 1945, RG
16, Box 35, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 15 May 1945, RG 16, Box
35, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 21 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 23 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Smith,
Triumph. 624.
27Fertig to MacArthur, 12 June 1945,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 19 June 1945, RG
Fertig to MacArthur, 27 June 1945, RG 16,
to MacArthur; 1 July 1945; RG 16, Box 36,
Triumph. 635-47.

RG 16, Box 36,
16, Box 36, MA;
Box 36, MA; Fertig
MA; Smith,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
U.S. forces knew so much about Japanese plans.

Partisan

information on Japanese airfields enabled U.S. aircraft to
neutralize any air threat to MacArthur's invasion of Leyte.
The resistance also allowed MacArthur's troops to exploit
the weaknesses of the Japanese on Mindanao.

The partisans

rendered valuable combat support when they protected a U.S.
Marine airfield at Dipolog, harassed Japanese retreats,
cleared beachheads, guarded another airfield for U.S.
spotter aircraft, and guided U.S. patrols through the jungle
trails.
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CONCLUSION

The U.S.-led Mindanao resistance force was transformed
from an independent guerrilla force in 1942 to a partisan
unit in 1943 that supported U.S. Army and Navy operations
with intelligence and combat assistance.

In late 1942 and

early 1943, Moros and Filipinos as well as unsurrendered
American soldiers formed separate guerrilla groups that
addressed local needs for civil government and protection
from Japanese patrols and indigenous bandits.

Fertig and

his American province commanders convinced Filipinos and
Moros that they could protect their families best with
organized guerrilla warfare.

Because the resistance was

adept at eluding Japanese forces, the Japanese never
destroyed it.

Fertig and his province commanders also built

an intelligence system that reported Japanese strength and
activities to SWPA HQ and the U.S. Navy.

When U.S. forces

landed on Mindanao in 1945, the partisans cleared
beachheads, blocked Japanese retreats, and collected
intelligence.
The Mincanaoans' hostile reaction to the brutal
Japanese occupation was predictable and was a foundation for
the Mindanao resistance.

The inhabitants had a guerrilla

war tradition that began against the Spanish and continued
against the Americans in 1898.

The Moros feared that U.S.

105
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troops would be as harsh as the Spanish; so, they fought the
U.S. garrison for 13 years.

Pershing used minimum force

against the guerrillas and established economic programs
that gave Moro businessmen significant profits and reduced
the fears of many Moro leaders.

The Japanese occupation

policy in Mindanao during World War II was very different.
The Japanese authorities tried to terrorize Moros and
Catholic Filipinos into submission with rape, torture, and
unnecessary destruction.

Japanese commanders made no real

attempt to earn the trust of the indigenous population.
Most villagers and townspeople were too proud or vengeful to
cooperate with the Japanese.
Seven resistance leaders organized their guerrillas in
the provinces.

The leaders used the most influential men to

gain local support.

Four of the seven leaders were American

officers who had several years of prewar duty in the
Philippines and who understood how to work with the
population.

The other three guerrilla leaders were

Mindanaoans with exceptional organizational skills, except
Morgan.

Brutal Japanese soldiers murdered Filipinos and

Moros while indigenous bandits stole food from Moros and
Filipinos.

These guerrilla leaders organized their men into

units that ambushed Japanese patrols and Mindanaoan bandit
groups.

The various guerrilla commanders reduced local

hardships by forming civil governments which tried to meet
most peasant requirements for food and shelter.

These

guerrilla leaders gained local support to make the guerrilla
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units stronger by providing a source for replacement of
casualties and recruits.
Due to Fertig's engaging personality, senior rank, and
official recognition from MacArthur, most guerrilla leaders
quickly joined him.
out of Mindanao.

Fertig transferred one rebel, Morgan,

Fertig separated two rival guerrilla

leaders and thus halted their fighting.

He clarified each

province commander's area of operation in order to use the
available manpower more efficiently.
province commanders were Americans.

Most of Fertig's
Because all were

members of the same military culture as the army they
supported, Americans were best suited to making the
resistance conform to MacArthur's objectives.

Only one man

could assign missions so that they could be accomplished in
an orderly manner.

Fertig's subordinate commanders insured

that the intelligence and combat missions were accomplished.
The American partisan commanders survived two major
Japanese offensives with active and passive strategies.

The

Japanese patrols were either too large to be stealthy or too
small and uncoordinated to avoid partisan ambushes or catch
fleeing partisans.

Partisan commanders gathered information

from spies for setting up deadly ambushes along likely
Japanese avenues of approach.

Partisan attacks along the

Sayre Road forced the enemy to employ roughly 1,000 men to
guard the road.

This guard duty denied those Japanese the

ability to launch offensive operations against the
partisans.

By not allowing themselves to be destroyed in
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battle, the partisans survived to support MacArthur's
return.
The partisans gave U.S. forces valuable support.

In

accordance with SWPA HQ directives, the partisans built an
intelligence system that reported enemy ground, air and sea
activities.

Partisan coastwatchers gave the U.S. Navy

information on the route of a Japanese fleet before it
attacked the American ships.

Resistance information on

Japanese airfields on Mindanao enabled U.S. Naval aircraft
to devastate Japanese planes on the island.

Partisan radio

traffic to Australia provided the Japanese another reason as
to how the U.S. recieved Japanese intelligence besides the
possibility that Americans broke the Japanese code.

This

event helped make it safer for MacArthur to invade Leyte
Island.

Partisan intelligence gave the 10th Corps planners

an accurate picture of Japanese strengths and locations
before the American landings on Mindanao occurred.

The

partisans further assured the security of the landings when
they cleared 200 enemy troops from the landing area at
Malabang City.

After the 10th Corps landed, the partisans

gave it important combat assistance.

Partisans harassed and

blocked Japanese retreats, which made it easier for U.S.
troops to destroy or capture the enemy.

The partisans were

not decisive in destroying the enemy garrison on Mindanao,
but they enabled a swifter campaign by the U.S. 10th Corps.
So that these lessons might be applied to upcoming
events with an open mind, future historians and military
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analysts should keep the following checklist in mind when
analyzing similar events.

Do the partisan leaders

understand the indigenous culture and thus convince the
local population to follow them?

Would they know how to

defeat rebellions within their organizations without causing
a civil war?

Do the armed forces have the capability to

supply the partisans and assist their leaders in unifying
and training the men?

Do the partisans understand how to

use the terrain to their advantage?

Would these partisans

be able to collect and send enemy intelligence without
leaving themselves too vulnerable to enemy offensives?
Could the resistance leaders train their people to operate
radios and collect accurate information?

Would the partisan

leaders be able to support their military's operations with
reliable intelligence, guide troops to enemy locations, and
participate in combat operations?
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